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HONORARY BADGES – 10TH PRINCESS MARY'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES

Phil Daybell

Two Honorary badges, together with six Battle Honours, were restored to this regiment by HM The Queen in 1988. These honours had been earned by the original regiment prior to 1890 but had not been carried since 1903.

The badge of a Rock Fort for Amboor was awarded in 1767 and the Elephant for Assaye in 1803. These two badges were traditionally combined as in Fig. 1, which was the design on the last set of Colours carried before the 10th became a Rifle Regiment.

Since the present regiment does not carry Colours, and also does not wish to disturb the design of its cap badge, it has been proposed that the badge should be worn on the left upper arm.

A modified design has therefore been prepared for a metal badge (Fig.2) and, for officers, a machine embroidered badge (Fig.3).

The badges show an Indian Fort (with rounded turrets rather than a European style castle) on a domed rock as of Amboor, placed similarly to a howdah on the back of an Indian Elephant, which stands on a wreath of colours as in the original Colours carried by the Regiment.

Amboor is located west of Madras, about halfway between Vellore and Bangalore. The action there presumably took place during the First Mysore War (1767-69) when the Madras Army, comprising British troops and Madrassi sepoy, attempted to defeat Haidar Ali, but was at that time too weak to do so. The Rock Fort badge is a very early distinction and unique to the regiment which earned it - the 14th Coast Sepoy Bn, raised in 1766, which became 11th Carnatic Bn. in 1769, but was re-numbered 10th in 1770. In 1784 this unit became the 10th Madras Bn. and in 1796 the 1st/10th Madras Native Inf. when the 19th Carnatic Bn., raised in 1777, became the 2nd/10th Madras N.I.


Assaye, near Poona, was a famous victory for Sir Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington. The battle took place in September 1803 during the Second Mahratta War. Wellesley's column included Madras native cavalry and infantry of which the 4th, 5th & 7th Madras Native Cavalry, and the 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th & 24th Madras NI were awarded the honour - 'Assaye'.

It has to be remembered that it was not until 1815, during the Gurkha War of 1814-16, that any Gurkha regiments served in the Indian Army. Then, during an armistice, four battalions were raised. One of these was disbanded in 1830 but the others eventually became the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

In 1890 the 1st Regt. Burma Infantry was formed from the Kubo Valley Police Bn., which had been raised in Burma. On the disbandment of the 10th Madras N.I, in 1891, it took over the number and was designated the 10th (1st Burma Bn.) Madras Infantry. Then in 1892 it changed to 10th (1st

Burma Rifles) Madras Infantry; in 1895 to 10th (1st Burma Gurkha Rifles) Madras Infantry and in 1901 to the 10th Gurkha Rifles.

In 1949, in recognition of its services during the 1939-45 War, the Regiment achieved its present title of 10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles.



CIVILIANS OF THE INDIAN MUTINY

T Ash

An interesting aspect of the Indian Mutiny, but one that often tends to be overlooked is the involvement of the European civilian population in India at that time. Tangible evidence of this can be found through their surviving Mutiny medals and, when traced to the Medal Rolls and other material, mainly to be found at the India Office Library and Records, London, opens a unique window onto the 19th Century civilian living and working in India.

The Mutiny, probably for the first time since Cromwell, brought an 'English' civilian population face to face with war, in what it considered to be its own backyard. Hundreds of civilians from all walks of life and strata of society, many of whose families had been established in India for several generations - civil servants, merchants, engineers, artisans, trades people - were suddenly and unexpectedly faced with a situation where pen, ledger, hammer and saw had to be discarded for the sword and the gun.

There was no room for conscientious objectors, even had they existed, for the Mutiny was a war of survival for these civilians and they responded accordingly. Some enlisted into volunteer military,

militia or police units specially raised for the emergency. Others grouped together informally in their own localities to protect their families and interests, while not a few served as individual volunteers with regular and irregular military units, short of strength or lacking in the local knowledge of the civilian on his home ground.

The defence of the Residency at Lucknow, arguably the most 'romantic' of the Mutiny campaigns, resulted in the entitlement of approximately 140-150 Mutiny medals to civilians with the coveted clasp 'Defence of Lucknow'. The most famous of these was James Cavanagh, an Uncovenanted civil servant, who was the first civilian to be awarded the Victoria Cross for his escape from the Residency disguised in native garb, to guide the relieving forces under Sir Colin Campbell into Lucknow in November 1857.

Two other less well known civilians, both of the Uncovenanted Civil Service, were also awarded the Victoria Cross for their deeds of valour during the Mutiny, These were William Fraser McDonell and Ross Lewis Mangles, who took part as volunteers in the disastrous attempt to relieve the party of civilians and Sikh sepoy besieged at Arrah, in July 1857. Although by date of deed they preceded that of Cavanagh, their awards were not gazetted until some years later. These are three of the four civilian VCs awarded to date.

However, the vast majority of civilians who received the Mutiny medal are now forgotten men, though occasionally one of their medals surfaces. In itself it does not tell you very much, probably no more than a name on a 'no clasp' medal. Some, of course, do have clasps and maybe a formation title, or Civil Service, all of which provides extra reference points for research. The facts that can be established vary from person to person. The members of the covenanted Civil Service have their careers well documented; an Uncovenanted civil servant, depending on the length of his service, probably less so; but the indigo planter, merchant or artisan may be more difficult to trace in any great detail. But in general it is nearly always possible to establish some facts other than 'Jas Smith' was awarded a Mutiny medal, as his award gleams dully from the palm of your hand.

"You can't find anything on these chaps" was a comment I heard recently when such a medal was proffered. But how satisfying it was to discover later in a well-known and popular up country newspaper, that the recipient was the Agent at Meerut, that place of ill fame in the annals of the Mutiny, with all the avenues of research that fact offered. Obviously some stories will have more colour and excitement than others. The formal record of service of covenanted civil servant take on a different hue when by chance you find him described in a colleague's diary as "boiling over with military ardour" and "donning on every possible occasion splendid uniform, a sword as long as a fishing rod", and so on, coupled with his exploits. Another unknown "killed one of the rebels with his own hands" whilst forsaking his indigo factory and answering the call to war.

The civilians of the Indian Mutiny should not be overlooked; they have interesting stories to tell - just like old soldiers!



WW II STARS AND MEDALS NAMED TO INDIAN ARMY SOLDIERS

Anthony Sudlow, TD

About the middle of 1989 I noted a few WW2 Stars and medals which arrived on dealers' lists named to Indian and Gurkha recipients. Though not many in number, there were enough to indicate

that they did not stem from the same source - perhaps a collector, based in India, who employed a bazaar silversmith to engrave or impress a few medals which had come, with details of rank, number, name and unit direct from recipients. Not a very realistic idea, granted, but WHY???

Luckily we have in the IMCS our very own General, and a distinguished one at that. I have never sounded him out on the subject, but it is possible that he is the senior Indian General, having been a King's Indian Commissioned Officer from the 1930s. I have extracted from him the information that he was awarded the OBE for his wartime services with 4 Indian Division - he commanded the Divisional Vickers Machine Gun Battalion (a battalion of his own Regiment, 6 Rajputana Rifles). After 1947 he rose, via Brigadier, to the command of the WW2 famous 5 Indian Division.

So - I wrote to General Das and asked him if he could throw some light on these named WW2 medals. I recall that those awarded to British personnel were sent blank, as the cost of impressing them with the details of the recipient and his service to King and Country was, if memory serves me correctly, estimated to be in the region of £46,000. Recipients were told that they could have the medals named at their own expense if they wanted to; Boots the Chemist had some machines installed in Branches which would stamp out whatever was desired, at a cost (again I trust that memory serves me correctly) of sixpence sterling per medal. One sees some examples from time to time - a few years ago I saw a group of four, named to a Piper of 2 KOSB, a distinguished unit which served with 7 Indian Division in the Arakan, around Imphal, and in the pursuit (1945) through central Burma. They were Brigaded with 1/11 Sikhs and 4/8 Gurkha Rifles.

The good General duly produced invaluable information which I propose to quote verbatim:

"WW2 medals for the Indian Army were struck at the Government of India Mint at Calcutta. The names and units were, however, struck by the Medal Section of the Ministry of Defence, on the basis of the Rolls sent by the Regimental Records Offices. I understand that some of the Rolls of the soldiers who had won them were delayed in the units/regiments because of the administrative problems of the post-partition period, and the J&K Operations. Moreover, in view of the large number of medals which had to be struck, there developed a considerable backlog in the Medal Section. It was, therefore, decided to transfer the task to the Records Sections of the units and regiments concerned and the medals and Rolls were sent back to the Regiments.

In the meantime, India became an independent sovereign Republic, and the title 'Royal' was dropped by all units holding that honour. It is quite possible that when the medals you have mentioned (a group of four to a Rifleman - 1939/45 and Burma Stars, War Medal, India Service Medal, designated 3/5 GR) were struck by 5 GR Records Office - the title 'Royal' was no longer in use".

Though this happened in the Indian Army, what of medals awarded to those who had served with units which had gravitated to the Army of Pakistan?

A pair (Africa Star, Italy Star) to a Rifleman of 3/18 R. Garhwal Rifles, who was killed in Italy and is named on the Cassino Memorial retains the 'Royal' prefix - presumably because he was killed before Independence, but we must realise that individual Regimental Records Offices might well have had their own ideas on change of titles.

I have noticed several General Service Medals, clasp 'S.E.ASIA 1945-46', from which the old 1922-1945 numbers have been omitted; e.g., one named to a Havildar, Dogra Regiment (instead of

17 Dogra Regiment). A full group of 5 (Independence 1947 [Hav, Raj. Rif.], 1939/45 and Burma Stars, War Medal, India Service Medal) - the last four show 'Indian Grenadiers'. General Das tells me that the old 4th Bombay Grenadiers became the Indian Grenadiers in 1945 or 1946. Titles in the 19th Hyderabad Regiment changed at the same time to Kumaon Rifles and Kumaon Regiment. In mixed regiments of Hindus, Sikhs and PMs it is easy to see that matters must have been complicated. Those still serving in August 1947 would have gone to either Army; Hindu and Sikhs to India, Mussalmans to the Army of Pakistan. But what of those who had been demobilised, or those who had lost their lives in WW2? Some Punjab regiments would have had mixed battalions in Malaya, Burma, North Africa, PAIFORCE and Italy, to say nothing of Eritrea and Abyssinia in 1940, thus leaving a trail of dead from several battalions in their wake. All very complicated, but of consequence and interest.

The naming of those hard-earned Stars by the Indian authorities may, indeed, have been only a half measure, one that fell short of full execution. But it was a noble effort nevertheless. Some may well never have been named, but delivered as issued. Some may never have been despatched - I know that several ex-soldiers of 3/10 and 4/10 GR did not receive their GSM with clasp for "S.E. Asia". Officers on tour in Nepal have been asked about them. But an effort WAS made, and at a time when the Indian nation was under considerable stress. The impressed letters are faint but nonetheless, I am glad to have those few which come my way. It helps to have an indication of where a particular soldier served, if you read up the Regimental History, or consult your Order of Battle.

As a footnote to the above article, my interest lies in the Indian State Forces and I have three examples of the GSM with clasp "S.E. Asia" 1945-46 to Patiala units; variously 1 Patiala Infy S.F., 2 Patiala Infy S.F., and Patiala S.F. About four years ago I was offered a WW2 and Independence group named to PEPSU Forces. PEPSU was the Patiala and East Punjab States Union but this organisation did not come into being until 15 July 1948, so PEPSU Forces could not possibly have earned medals prior to this date. An example, perhaps, of the time delay between the actual events and the subsequent issuing and naming of medals, as well as bearing out the above points that unit designations inscribed on the medals were often those in being at the time of issue, rather than at the time of award. Ed.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ACTION OF GENERAL DYER AT AMRITSAR - 1919

Lt Col A A Mains late 9th Gurkha Rifles, I.A.

After half a century of quiet following the suppression of the Great Mutiny, the first of the cycles of agitation which gripped India during the twentieth century began in 1903. The ostensible reason was the unpopular partition of Bengal, but the real cause was the capture of the All India Congress by left wing elements demanding immediate self-government.

This agitation continued sporadically until the outbreak of World War I. One of the worst outrages was the bombing of the Viceregal procession through Delhi in 1912. The Viceroy was severely injured.

The trouble started again in 1918 with Gandhi's campaign of "non-violence" in support of self-rule. He miscalculated, however, the effect of "non-violence" on an excited and excitable Indian mob and disorder was inevitable. The Government countered by strengthening the laws against sedition, the new laws being known collectively as the Rowlatt Acts. This only provoked renewed agitation, this time against the Acts themselves.

THE SITUATION IN THE PUNJAB IN 1919

This action by Gandhi provoked serious disorder in Western India and Calcutta where, additionally, there was labour trouble, but it was in the Punjab, badly hit by agrarian distress, that the worst of the trouble occurred. This was serious enough to be described as "near insurrection" in some Districts. Matters were made worse by a large scale tribal uprising on the Frontier and the possibility of war with Afghanistan.

Brigadier General Dyer (who had taken command and control in Amritsar following the breakdown of law and order, heard on the 13th April that a prohibited meeting was to be held in the Jallianwala Bagh, an open space in the city surrounded by buildings and from which there was only one outlet. He marched to the spot with 25 men of the 1/9th Gurkha Rifles and 25 men of the 59th Scinde Rifles (later the 6th (Royal) Battalion of the 13th Frontier Force Rifles), opened fire on the meeting without any warning, continued to fire until his ammunition was exhausted, and then marched off leaving the wounded to fend for themselves. 379 were killed and over 1200 wounded.

The General stated later that he intended to teach a lesson which would be felt throughout the whole of India, and there is no doubt that the trouble in the Punjab ceased as soon as the news was known. This was a great relief to the Government, as the 3rd Afghan War broke out shortly afterwards. Many Europeans hailed Dyer as the "Saviour of India" who had prevented a second "Mutiny".

THE MILITARY POSITION

Serious trouble had occurred in Amritsar, which included the murder of some Europeans. The local garrison was very small and inadequate even to provide static guards to safeguard life and property. It certainly was not in a position to restore law and order. It was fortunate that a troop train was passing through and the General was able to take men of the Gurkhas and Scinde Rifles off it. These men were unarmed, and in the case of the Gurkhas, were mostly straight from recruit training, on their way to join their Battalion in Peshawar. Fifty men from each party were issued with rifles from the Indian Defence Corps Armoury in the Fort. The Indian Defence Corps were European part time soldiers. The General took a calculated risk in taking such a small force to deal with a mob of several thousands.

THE LEGAL POSITION

Practically everything that the General did was wrong in law and negated the principles of British rule in India. It was at variance with the (Indian) Code of Criminal Procedure, the Manual of Military Law and the Manual of Indian Military Law in that:-

a) No attempt was made to order the meeting to disperse. As an order prohibiting any meetings had been promulgated, the General had the legal right to disperse the crowd on his own authority, but only after an order to disperse had been disobeyed. He would have been justified in opening fire without warning ONLY if he was in fear of being attacked and having his small force

overwhelmed. He at no time said that this was the case. Once fire had been opened it was impossible for the crowd to disperse as his force blocked the only exit.

b) There was no evidence that all of the crowd was connected with the agitation. A normal Indian crowd would contain probably about 50% innocent bystanders.

c) Firing was not controlled, each man fired "at will".

d) Nothing was done to deal with the wounded.

THE AFTERMATH

The casualty figures were exceptionally severe, when no actual attack on the troops had been made. Sir George Dunbar's History of India, Vol. II, states - "casualties irrefutably beyond the action necessary to disperse the assembly" and "the shock of the action taken aroused amongst Indians a feeling of horror and racial bitterness unknown for sixty years". The Commander of the Gurkha detachment always had a feeling of shame over the incident. Modern Indian writing often attributes, wrongly, the action to British troops.

Controversy has raged over Dyer's action - many said that his prompt action saved much trouble later, and this is probably true. It is equally probable, however, that prompt and stern action within the law would have had the same effect. There seems no good reason why an order to disperse could not have been given, nor why firing was not controlled. An order for each man to fire one round would have had just as good an effect.

CONCLUSIONS

Dyer's action was a classic example of a correct action done the wrong way. Why did he do it? The climate of opinion amongst Government officials and Europeans must be taken into account.

There is no doubt that the serious disorders in the Punjab (the anchor Province of the Great Mutiny), coupled with the tribal uprising and war with Afghanistan, caused a great fright, even panic, amongst officialdom and memories of the Mutiny were revived. This was reflected in the re-organisation of the Indian Defence Force into the Auxiliary Force India (AFI) when, in the next year, no fewer than seven new unbrigaded Field Batteries and twelve independent Machine Gun Companies were raised - the Government of India was taking no chances.

Was the situation so serious when compared with 1930 and 1942? In 1919 only four IDF units were called out - two in Calcutta, one in Bombay and the Punjab Rifles. No Railway unit was called out so there can have been no serious threat to communications.

The call out in 1930 was sixteen AFI units from all over India and included all the Railway units except one, the South India Railway Battalion. The 1919 disturbances in the Punjab speak of "near insurrection", but this occurred again and over a much wider area in 1930, coupled with the Red Shirt movement in the Frontier Province, terrorist murders in Bengal, and the Chittagong Armoury Raid which, had it succeeded, would have meant the probable loss of the town to the insurgents.

The disturbances in 1942 were sufficiently serious to become known as the "42 Rebellion", and necessitated the call out of twelve AFI units, in addition to another six, already under arms, as they had been embodied as part of the war effort. There was serious rioting in practically every major

town; in Delhi itself three railway signal cabins were wrecked and burnt. There was near insurrection in the rural areas of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, the western part of Bengal, the Central Provinces, the western part of the United Provinces and eastern Bihar; only in the north west (Punjab etc.) and the north east (Assam) did normal conditions prevail.

The actual rebellion was in the eastern part of the U.P., and the west of Bihar astride the three main west to east railway lines. In about seven Districts in each Province all control was lost outside the District Headquarters towns; rural police stations were captured or abandoned and communications severed. In one District, Ballia, the District Magistrate (Nigam ICS) surrendered his Kutchery (District Courts) to the insurgents, who appointed one of their number in his place and hoisted the Congress Flag. The railway lines were torn up systematically over a wide area, signalling equipment smashed and even 40 foot bridge spans dropped. Order was not restored for about a month, and due to the paucity of troops, who were mostly on the Burma Front, pacification was done largely by the Police, including the U.P.'s para military Special Armed Constabulary; the whole under a Commissioner from the Indian Civil Service.

There is no doubt that the situation in 1930 and in 1942 was more serious than in 1919, but the Government and Europeans had by then come to look upon anti Government disorders as endemic and nothing to get excited about. I remember as Chief Intelligence Officer of Central Command in 1946 being told that we should be prepared for disorder and insurrection on a large scale, but this did not worry me unduly.

BOOK REVIEW

'*THE AMRITSAR LEGACY*', Roger Perkins. Picton Publishing (Chippenham) Ltd., 1989. 233 pages, £16.95

As a fellow medal collector I admire Roger's ability to put an interesting story together based on the purchase of two medals. Both were Indian General Service Medals, 1908-35. The first, to Lieutenant J.C. O'Dwyer, Indian Army Reserve of Officers, bore the clasp 'Afghanistan NWF 1919'. The second, to Udam Singh, Railways, bore the clasp 'Waziristan 1919-21'. Lieutenant John 'Jack' O'Dwyer was the son of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab at the time of the Amritsar massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, in 1919. Udam Singh, who claimed to be at Jallianwala Bagh at the time of the massacre, subsequently assassinated Sir Michael O'Dwyer at Caxton Hall, London, on 13 March 1940. Thus the connection is made between the two medals and it is against this background that the story unfolds.

Most students of India's military or political history will be aware, at least in outline, of what occurred at Jallianwala Bagh on that fateful day when Brigadier General Reginald Dyer ordered his troops to open fire on the gathering. Others will have a more detailed knowledge and, indeed, elsewhere in this edition there appears another reassessment, submitted quite coincidentally and independently by Lieutenant Colonel Tony Mains.

Given the number of accounts written over the years, is it, as the author asks, appropriate to produce yet another? Roger pulls no punches in suggesting that Dyer, along with a number of other Britons in India in 1919, had lost any sense of purpose and direction. He also draws on previously unpublished evidence to produce a graphic account of the events leading up to the massacre, and of the post-massacre enquiries. As such it is an assessment worth having on one's bookshelf.

There are, however, aspects of the book which, in the opinion of this reviewer, detract from its overall impact. Whether or not, to quote the press release from the publisher, Dyer's actions "... indirectly, ensured the eventual demise of the British Empire," is debatable. I also question the notion that "events . . . have flowed from it [the massacre] over the past seventy years", especially when this is used to imply that disturbances at Amritsar in recent years are in any way connected.

The author draws attention in his own introduction to the possibility that a disproportionate amount of space has been devoted to the execution of Udham Singh. He excuses this on two grounds; first, a need to dispel accusations that Udham Singh was callously victimised by the British prison service prior to and during his execution, and secondly, to educate those debating the reintroduction of capital punishment as to what is involved. Of his first aim he has probably succeeded but I honestly doubt that this book will reach such an audience as to sway one way or the other the argument about hanging. Indeed, since he includes in his bibliography "*Executioner, Pierrepont*" by Albert Pierrepont, I assume that anyone wanting to consider the matter in such detail will refer to the original work. As such I do not believe its inclusion here was justified.

I found Chapter 10, "Who was Udham Singh", long on speculation but short on supportable fact. While there may be odd aspects to Udham Singh's background, I am not aware that a criminal conviction is a bar to obtaining a passport, especially when that conviction was under another name. I found the "MI5 agent" theory difficult to swallow. No evidence was produced. Roger actually maintains that Udham Singh's Special Branch files "will probably never be published [and] the MI5 files, if any such record ever existed, were doubtless shredded many years ago", so the whole chapter seems to me to have been based on pure speculation.

I also found the inclusion of a number of photographs unnecessary, e.g., the execution of Indian soldiers by Japanese troops during the Second World War, and various photographs of British troops in Northern Ireland since 1969. In this last regard, I question the author's inference that Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) as exercised today is a "Legacy" of the Amritsar affair. I would contend that the author's quote from Winston Churchill about Jallianwala Bagh (page 115) seems to support this view:

"This is an episode which appears to me without precedent or parallel..... It is an event of entirely different order from any of those tragic circumstances which take place when troops are brought into collision with the civil population....."

Finally, "Whether Churchill realised that he might have been an alternative target for Udham Singh is impossible to say, but it may not be without significance that General Vernon Kell, the head of MI5, was summarily sacked by Churchill..." (page 141) rather destroys the author's theory that Sir Michael O'Dwyer's assassination was an act of revenge for Jallianwala Bagh. Churchill became Prime Minister after the Caxton Hall shooting, so I do not see why he should be considered an alternative target. The case for this theory is weak.

In spite of the above I enjoyed the book on the whole. It also has a particular interest for me, as the following article relates.

ANM

ANOTHER AMRITSAR CONNECTION - THE MEDALS OF LT COL ABDUL RAHMAN MASSEY

Tony McClenaghan

I bought the group of medals shown below at the OMRS Convention in the Summer of 1988, first, because of the fascinating combination incorporating medals of an Indian Princely State and British medals named to two separate units, and secondly, because the fact that the recipient obviously converted to Islam at some time in his life promised an interesting story. I had no idea of the background of the man at the time and it was only in subsequent months, as I learnt that Roger Perkins was including a reference to Massey in his new book, "*The Amritsar Legacy*", that the picture started to unfold. My research on Massey is incomplete, but so far I have determined the following.

James William Massey was born on 18 October 1877. According to my research, Massey was appointed to a commission in the East Griqualand Mounted Rifles in October 1899. The EGMR, a South African unit which existed between 1892 and 1920, was formed of locally resident European volunteers and organised into seven troops. It served in the suppression of the Le Fleur rebellion of the Griquas (1897), the Boer War, and later the First World War. Massey, however, only served during the Boer War and retired voluntarily with the rank of Captain in April 1902.

On the outbreak of the First World War Massey was living in Hampshire and was granted a commission as Second Lieutenant in the Hampshire Regiment. Service in France saw him invalided home in 1916, as a result of which it was recommended that he serve in warm climates only.

In January 1917 he was seconded for duty with a Garrison Battalion and, in February, sailed for India with 1st (Garrison) Bn, Somerset Light Infantry. In the early part of 1918 he was sent to Amritsar as Officer Commanding Troops, a post he still held in April 1919 when the troubles in that city started to develop. The arrival of Major Macdonald on 10 April, and then Brigadier General Dyer, meant that Massey relinquished his command, but he remained in Amritsar throughout the disturbances. He subsequently gave evidence to the Hunter Committee investigating the circumstances surrounding the Jallianwala Bagh massacre.

Massey relinquished his commission in March 1920 (Army Order 101/1920) and then took service with the Nawab of Bahawalpur, ending his career commanding the 1st Sadiq Infantry. According to sources in Bahawalpur, Massey died while in service in about 1936 and was buried close to Dera Nawab where his unit was stationed.

Short of finding any diaries or correspondence written by Massey it must, I feel, remain a matter of conjecture as to why he chose his particular course of action. It may well be, as Roger Perkins feels, that Massey was expressing his opinion of British policies in general, and the O'Dwyer administration of Punjab in particular.

His medals are:



Intiaz-i-Abbasia (5th Class) – engraved LT.COL. ABDUL RAHMAN MASSEY, 1st BSI

Bahawalpur Army Long Service (medal identification not yet confirmed) - engraved LT.COL. ABDUL RAHMAN MASSEY, 1st BSI

British-Bahawalpur Alliance Centenary - impressed LT COL A.R MASSEY 1st BAHR. SAD. INF."

QSA clasp 'Cape Colony' & KSA – impressed CAPT. J.W. MASSEY E.G.M. RIFLES

War Medal & Victory Medal – impressed CAPT. J.W. MASSEY HANTS. REGT.

REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

● In Vol. 3, No 2, p.27, Peter Monahan described an unidentified badge of winged sun above shield supported by elephants, the whole resting on a bugle horn (Fig.1). Michael Johnson added to the correspondence in Vol. 3, No 4, p.25. I have long had an example of this badge and I know that, like me, other collectors have held it in the "unidentified" section.


I recently purchased the two-part "*Drapeaux et Armoiries des Etats Princiars des Indes Britanniques*" by Andre Flicher. In it he portrays a selection of coats of arms, both of States and of individual Maharajas and the coat of arms at Fig.2 is attributed to the Maharaja of Dewas Senior for 1877. The shield contains the figure of Hanuman with, above, a lotus flower and two flames.

The bugle horn badge is not identical. For instance, the elephant trunks are in a different position to those in the 1877 coat of arms, and the wings of the sun are spread instead of upright. Nevertheless, I think there are sufficient similarities between the two to make the identification of Dewas Senior a strong possibility.


The question that still needs answering, assuming my assumption is correct, is what is the badge? According to my research Dewas Senior maintained no troops under either the Imperial Service Troops or Indian State Forces schemes. Nor is Dewas identified in the survey of Princely State armies conducted by Major Owen T Burne CSI and reported in his "*Memorandum - Native States and Armies*", published on 4 April 1873.

Any ideas gratefully received.

Tony McClenaghan



● Lieutenant Commander W.M. Thornton requests help in identifying two badges shown below. They are probably Indian Police, but Fig.2 is thought not to be from the Punjab.



REPLIES TO EARLIER QUERIES

The formation sign at Page 18 of Vol. 6, No.4 is of XV Corps, Indian Army.

Maj. Gen. Chand N Das & Lt. Cdr. W.M. Thornton

INDIAN CAVALRY 1857-1861

C.J. Parrett

Continuing the series, herewith the fact sheet for the 8th Bengal Irregular Cavalry. (See page 10 of Vol.6, No.1 for abbreviations).

8TH BENGAL IRREGULAR CAVALRY

8th Bengal Irregular Cavalry		IOL L/Mil/5 references					
Names on Roll	Ranks	Clasps					77(BJR). Summary roll listing only British officers by name.
		D	L	M			Remarks
Mackenzie A M	Capt			1			Offg.-Comd at Bareilly when regt. mutinied, and "raised the new 8th Irregular Cavalry" at Campers in March 53 (Ubique).
Campbell A.H.	Major			1			Commanded SBIC in Ouda 1858-59.
Woodcock E.H.	Lieut	1					With 1st Bgl Bur. Fusiliers during latter part of siege & capture of Delhi, and SBIC in the Doab, March 1858.
Blackburne T.G.	Lieut		1				Served as Act. Adjutant from April 1858. Used Seetapore on 29th July 1859. Service at Lucknow not traced.
Currie J.A.	ASurg			1			Served with SBIC throughout Mutiny, and MID for Harrah, April 1858.
All other ranks				156			Summarized but not listed by name.
Total known claims		161	1	1	159		
SBIC officers known to have served in Mutiny but not on roll							
Becher D.W.	Lieut	Adjutant and Offg. 2 i/c at Bareilly when the SBIC mutinied. Commanded a detachment and MID at repulse of rebels at Haldwani, September 1857.					
Mir Walayat Ali	Rsal	At Bareilly May 1857; OBI (1st class).					
Buland Khan	Rsal	On furlough May 1857; OBI (1st class).					
Muhammad Nizam Khan	Rsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Resaldar; OBI (1st class).					
Ganga Singh	Rsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Naib-Resaldar; OBI (2nd class); wounded Harrah, March 1858.					
Sahib Zuma Khan	Rsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Resaldar.					
Mir Husen Ali	Rsal	At Etawah i/c detachment; promoted from Dafadar.					
Allah Nur Khan	Rsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Naib-Resaldar.					
Mateh Khan	Rsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Naib-Resaldar.					
Sheikh Bahadur Ali	NRsal	At Agra May 1857 i/c detachment; OBI (1st class); wounded Harrah, March 1858.					
Eher Muhammad Khan	NRsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Jemadar.					
Ali Ahmed Khan	NRsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Jemadar.					
Kadam Khan	NRsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Jemadar; KIA Haldwani, September 15th 1857.					
Rahim Baksh	NRsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Jemadar.					
Mir Waqid Ali	NRsal	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Kot-Dafadar.					
Sheikh Rahimuddin	Jem	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Kot-Dafadar; IOM (3rd class) for Harrah, March 1858.					
Nurul Hassan	Jem	At Bareilly May 1857; promoted from Dafadar.					
Wazir Khan	Jem	On furlough May 1857; promoted from Dafadar; son of Risaldar Buland Khan.					
Sayad Ali Khan	Jem	At Agra with Lt. Governor's Escort May 1857; promoted from Sowar; raised to IOM (2nd class).					
Subhan Ali	Jem	At Agra with Lt. Governor's Escort May 1857; promoted from Sowar; raised to IOM (2nd class).					
Tahawar Khan	Jem	At Moradabad May 1857; promoted from Kot-Dafadar.					
Mir Sami-ulah	Jem	At Moradabad May 1857; promoted from Kot-Dafadar.					

Stationed at Bareilly in May 1857 with detachments at Etawah and Moradabad, and at Agra serving as Escort to the Lieutenant Governor. Influenced by disaffection throughout the garrison, and incited by its own senior native officer Mahomed Shaffi, the left wing of the regiment joined the mutineers on the parade ground at Bareilly on May 31st 1857 and marched to Delhi where it served with some notoriety in the besieged rebel army. The loyal remnant of 8BIC numbering only 23 all ranks escorted the European survivors from Bareilly to Naini Tal and Haldwani, and remained in this area on policing duties. In October this small band accompanied by Mackenzie, Becher and Currie marched to Meerut where it was joined by a handful of VCOs and men who had been on furlough or with detachments. By this time the loyal remnant totalled 12 VCOs and 37 other ranks and, with its ranks further augmented by faithful fragments from other corps, it served with Mr Wilson in maintaining order in the Meerut district until Feb. 1858. With its strength increased to 200 sabres it then moved to Cawnpore where it was brought up to full strength. It continued to operate against dissidents in the Doab between the Ganges and the Jumna under Mackenzie and Woodcock. In May 1861 its designation was changed to 6th Bengal Cavalry.

SERGEANT WILLIAM WALTER THOMAS, LAWRENCE MILITARY ASYLUM, SANAWAR

A G Mann

William Walter Thomas was born on the 22nd of November, 1864, in the Parish of Langley, at Burrell, Wiltshire. He was the son of Henry John Thomas, a carpenter of Chippenham, and Anne Symes, his wife from Devon.

William Thomas, by now a carpenter, was recruited into the Royal Field Artillery by Sergeant Smith of the Dorset Regiment on the 15th of January, 1885, at Newport, Monmouthshire. According to his service documents his description at this time was 20 years and 2 months old, 5'5" tall, 133 pounds in weight and having grey eyes and brown hair.

He served within the United Kingdom as a Gunner and Driver with the 3rd Brigade RFA until he embarked for service in India, on the Jumna, on the 10th of October, 1885. The next mentions of him in his documents show that he was stationed at Agra as a member of the 9th Field Battery. He took leave to England and got married. The marriage took place at the Parish Church at Chippenham, on the 4th of July, 1894, and his bride was Mathilda Strange of Chippenham. This marriage was to be short lived as his bride died whilst in India on the 5th of November, 1895. She is shown as being with him on station at Agra.

Thomas was by now a Corporal Wheeler, having passed the appropriate examinations to elevate him to this grade. He had also re-engaged to complete his 21 years of service with the Army and taken his next step into the future with a transfer to the Bengal Unattached List.

He volunteered to become a Carpentry and Joinery Instructor at the Lawrence Military Asylum, Sanawar. He must have considered this to be better than being a Battery Corporal Wheeler in the Royal Field Artillery.

Once again Thomas married; his new bride, Mary Ann Lightfoot, was from the Asylum at Sanawar and they were married there on the 5th of September, 1898.

Sergeant Thomas was awarded his only medal *vide* GGO 404d of the 1st of May, 1903, and that was the Long Service and Good Conduct Medal. This was named to him as Sergt. W W Thomas, Lawrence Military Asylum, Sanawar.

Sergeant and Mrs Thomas stayed at the Lawrence Military Asylum until he was transferred to the 46th Battery RFA for discharge on the 30th of November, 1905. They embarked on this day for England on the 'Sicilia' and he was duly discharged at Gosport on the 15th of February, 1906. They intended to live at No 1 May Cottages, Langley, Burrell, Chippenham, Wiltshire.

William Walter Thomas died at his home at Galiano Island, British Columbia, Canada, on the 7th of January, 1941, as a result of Bronchial Pneumonia. He was survived by his wife Mary. It is not known if they had any children.

Can any member offer further information in regard to Sergeant Thomas or the Lawrence Military Asylum at Sanawar?

Information from - WO 97/6066, L/MIL/10/236, 234 & 298. Death Certificate from Archives, British Columbia.

