

## DURBAR Volume 20, No.2, Summer 2003

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130<sup>th</sup> KING GEORGE'S OWN BALUCHIS (JACOB'S RIFLES)

Lt Col Neville Poulson

All photos this section R C Worts

### LINEAGE

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| 1858-1861 | 1 <sup>st</sup> Belooch Regiment (Jacob's Rifles)                                       |
| 1861      | Jacob's Rifles  |
| 1861-1881 | 30 <sup>th</sup> Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (or) Jacob's Rifles                    |
| 1881-1885 | 30 <sup>th</sup> Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (or) 3 <sup>rd</sup> Belooch Battalion |
| 1885-1891 | 30 <sup>th</sup> Regiment Bombay Infantry (or) (3 <sup>rd</sup> Baluch Battalion)       |
| 1891-1901 | 30 <sup>th</sup> Regiment Bombay Infantry (or) 3 <sup>rd</sup> Baluch Battalion         |
| 1901-1903 | 30 <sup>th</sup> Baluch Infantry  |
| 1903-1906 | 130 <sup>th</sup> Baluchis  |
| 1906-1910 | 130 <sup>th</sup> Prince of Wales's Own Baluchis  |
| 1910      | 130 <sup>th</sup> Prince of Wales's Own Baluchis (Jacob's Rifles)                       |
| 1910-1922 | 130 <sup>th</sup> King George's Own Baluchis (Jacob's Rifles)                           |

### BATTLE HONOURS

|            |                       |
|------------|-----------------------|
| 1881       | AFGHANISTAN 1878-1880 |
| 1901 added | CHINA 1900            |

### SECTION I : POUCH

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| c. 1891      | Silver bugle [DR 1891]  |
| c. 1901      | Silver bugle [DR 1901]  |
| c. 1903-1922 | The Royal and Imperial Cypher surmounted by a Tudor crown [DR 1913] |

### SECTION II : POUCH BELT

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| c. 1891 | Silver Regimental plate [DR 1891]  |
| c. 1901 | Laurel wreath surmounted by a crown, enclosing a Maltese Cross on centre of which is a crescent with '3' inside. 'BALUCH REGIMENT' inscribed on the crescent; underneath plate a scroll with 'AFGHANISTAN 1878-80' [DR 1901] |

- c. 1906 A laurel wreath surmounted by the Prince of Wales's plumes enclosing a Maltese Cross, in the centre of which is a crescent with '130' inside and 'P.W.O. BALUCHIS' inscribed on crescent, 'CHINA 1900' inscribed on top bar of Maltese Cross. Underneath a scroll with 'AFGHANISTAN 1878-1880'.



- c.1910-1922 A laurel wreath surmounted by the Prince of Wales's plumes enclosing a Maltese Cross, in the centre of which is a crescent with '130' inside and 'K.G.O. BALUCHIS' inscribed on the crescent, 'CHINA 1900' inscribed on the top bar of the Maltese Cross. Underneath a scroll with 'AFGHANISTAN 1878-1880'. [DR 1913]

SECTION III : WAIST PLATE

No details available

SECTION IV : HEADDRESS

PART I : FORAGE CAP

- c. 1906-1922 Prince of Wales's plume in silver [DR 1913]



c. 1903-1922 A Maltese Cross, with a crescent in the centre inscribed 'BALUCHIS', and '130' within the crescent. Officers – silver, Other Ranks – bronze



#### PART II : FOR PEACE MANOEUVRES

c. 1891 Silver bugle placed on a red boss [DR 1891]



#### PART III : FIELD CAP

c. 1901 A silver bugle [DR 1901]

c. 1906-1922 Prince of Wales's plumes in silver [DR 1913]



#### PART IV : PAGRI

No details available

PART V : HELMET

c. 1906-1910 Prince of Wales's plume in silver with scroll underneath inscribed 'P.W.O. BALUCHIS'



c. 1910-1922 Prince of Wales's plumes in silver with scroll underneath inscribed 'K.G.O. BALUCHIS' [DR 1913]



**Web site note – this version in brass**

SECTION V : SHOULDER TITLE

c. 1881-1885 'III' over 'BELOOCH'



c. 1906-1922 The Prince of Wales's plumes with '130' above and 'BALUCHIS' below.



#### SECTION VI : BUTTONS

1903-1922 Ball button. Silver

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#### THE ARMED CIVIL FORCES OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE - PART III

Tim Ash

[The following information has been extracted from the 70 page *Report of the Committee on the Armed Civil Forces of the North-West Frontier Province 1926* (OIOC [BL] L/MIL/17/13/31). The Report is a comprehensive document on the conditions of the Province as they were in 1926. The Committee made certain recommendations in the Report on future establishments and deployments; these are not included.]

#### TRANS FRONTIER CORPS

The Trans Frontier Corps are three in number,

Tochi Scouts

South Waziristan Scouts

Kurram Militia

#### WAZIRISTAN

The two Corps of Waziristan Scouts (Tochi & South Waziristan) are the successors of the old North and South Waziristan Militia. They differ essentially from the old formations in that they have been

deliberately reconstituted as "foreign" forces. In the South Waziristan Scouts no local enlistment is so far permitted while in the Tochi Scouts the local element is little more than nominal.

The primary duties of the Scouts are to maintain political control, within the two Agencies into which Waziristan is divided, to prevent raiding, to ensure security of communications and to deal with any tribal disturbance or acts of external aggression, alone or in conjunction with the Army.

The presence of the Scouts in Waziristan is an important factor in securing for the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts immunity from raids, particularly where the lines held by the Scouts cut across routes ordinarily used by raiding gangs.

#### FORMATION OF THE TWO CORPS

The reorganisation of the Tochi Scouts was completed in 1922 and by 1923 the Corps was fully established and carrying out its duties in the Tochi Agency.

The South Waziristan Scouts were not fully raised until the middle of 1923 and neither their training nor construction of their posts was sufficiently advanced to enable them to take over their full duties until toward the end of that year.

#### TOCHI SCOUTS

##### Establishment

|                  |      |
|------------------|------|
| British officers | 12   |
| Indian ranks     | 2278 |

Divided into two Wings and organised in 39 Platoons of infantry, and 2 Platoons mounted infantry.

#### PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOCHI SCOUTS

| POST                          | STRENGTH IN PLATOONS              |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Miranshah                     | 10 infantry<br>1 mounted infantry |
| Datta Khel                    | 4 infantry                        |
| Boya                          | 2 infantry                        |
| Mir Ali                       | 2 infantry<br>1 mounted infantry  |
| Spinwam                       | 7 infantry                        |
| Shewa                         | 3 infantry                        |
| Khaujuri (with Shinki Towers) | 9 infantry                        |
| Razmak                        | 2 infantry                        |

## Notes

- Miranshah** Is the headquarters of the Agency and of the Tochi Scouts. A flight of the Royal Air Force is located there. Miranshah carries out all the functions of a headquarters for the Tochi Scouts and provides the main striking force for employment anywhere within the Agency.
- Datta Khel** The importance of Datta Khel is mainly political. It is the headquarters of the Political tehsil for the Upper Tochi and enables the Political Agent to exercise some control in this area. Situated 25 miles from Miranshah it is, militarily speaking, a somewhat inconvenient distant detachment, but in view of the political considerations and the moral effect of the presence there of Scouts after the events of 1919, its retention as a Scout post is desirable.
- Boya** Is of little importance and in due course of time it should be found possible to hand this post over to Khassadars. For the time being, it is valuable as a staging post between Miranshah and Datta Khel. Reliefs and other traffic up and down the valley may frequently be delayed here when the Tochi River is in flood.
- Mir Ali** This post is a good centre for mounted infantry, who can be effectively employed in the open country in its vicinity. It is also required as a staging post for the Spinwam line. For topographical reasons Mir Ali appears a better location than Idak for the regular garrison in the Lower Tochi, and, should this transfer take place subsequently, Mir Ali post might be included in the camp or cantonment occupied by regulars and the necessity for a Scout post would no longer exist.
- Spinwam** The necessity for this post is mainly political and a tehsil is located there for dealing with the Kabul Khel Wazirs. It is also of importance as a post on the Thal - Idal road and its situation on the Kaitu River renders it well placed to deal with raiding gangs from Khost. The early construction of the Thal - Spinwam - Idak motor road, to enable Spinwam, and also Shewa, to be easily maintained and quickly reinforced is most desirable.
- Shewa** The duties of the post at Shewa are supplementary to those of the main post at Spinwam.
- Khaujuri** Is the centre of an important group of defences in a difficult and dangerous sector of our communications in the Lower Tochi, which in the past has been much exposed to raids by Wazirs from the north and by Mahsuds from the south. It consists of a main post at Khaujuri with Shinki post and four towers as subsidiary defences.
- Razmak** Scouts are stationed at Razmak purely for political purposes connected with the dealings of the Resident and Political Agent with the Mahsuds.

## SOUTH WAZIRISTAN SCOUTS

### Establishment

British officers 14  
Indian ranks 2774

Divided into three Wings with headquarters at Jandola, Sarwakai and Sorarogha. Like the Tochi Scouts they are organised on a platoon basis, have 48 platoons of infantry and 2 platoons of mounted infantry.

#### PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF SOUTH WAZIRISTAN SCOUTS

POST STRENGTH IN PLATOONS

##### **Jandola Wing**

Jandola 13 infantry  
1 mounted infantry

Chagmalai 3 infantry

Kotkai\* 5 infantry

Ahnai Tangi\* 2 infantry

##### **Sarwakai Wing**

Sarwakai 11 infantry  
1 mounted infantry

Splitoi 5 infantry

##### **Sorarogha Wing**

Sorarogha 9 infantry

\* Kotkai and Ahnai Tangi are at present included in the Sorarogha Wing.

##### **Notes**

Jandola Jandola is the headquarters of the South Waziristan Scouts and a tehsil. It is also the headquarters of the Jandola Wing. It is important that an adequate striking force should be retained here ready to re-enforce either the Sarwakai or Sorarogha Wing and that there should be sufficient strength for patrolling in the lower Tank Zam and Shuza areas.

Chagmalai This post is at the entrance to the Shahur Tangi and was of great importance during the early days of our occupation of South Waziristan. Under present conditions, it is of somewhat less importance, but the time has not yet come when it could safely be entrusted to Khassadars.

Splitoi This is an important post at the upper end of the Shahur Tangi and, in conjunction with Sarwakai, affords a valuable protective screen against raiding into the Dera Ismail Khan district.

- Sarwakai This is a Wing headquarters and tehsil, and it is our advance post in the direction of Wana. As mentioned under Splitoi, it is most useful as a check to raiding, and it is politically of great importance in enabling what little control we have over the Wana Wazirs to be exercised.
- Kotkai This post is at the junction of the Inzar Tangi with the Tank Zam and is still important for road protection and patrolling duties which require parties in some strength.
- Ahnai Tangi This is merely a post for road protection purposes located at a dangerous point on the route.
- Sorarogha This is a Wing headquarters and also a tehsil and is of both political and military importance. It is at present the most advanced Scout post on the road from Jandola to Razmak and is 24 miles distant from the latter place. Having no Scout post further north to secure the safety of the road, considerable strength has to be maintained at Sorarogha if patrols are to operate with freedom or safety.

#### THE KURRAM MILITIA

Neither the political situation in and around the Kurram nor the establishment, composition and distribution of the Kurram Militia have changed materially since pre-war days. The militia have an excellent record and, whether in peace, disturbed tribal conditions, or in war, have discharged their duties efficiently and loyally. The question of class composition in the Kurram Militia is entirely different from that of the Waziristan Scouts. It is a Militia in the true sense of the term, the personnel being almost entirely local. Special conditions make this possible and desirable in the Kurram Valley, where there is a Shia community surrounded by Sunni neighbours. Owing to the traditional enmity existing between these two sects, we can place a large measure of reliance on the loyalty of the Tiris. The small local Sunni element (approximately 12%) of Mangals and Chamkannis does not present any danger, and they have proved themselves useful and reliable material. The Corps also contains two platoons (110 men) of Khattaks. This small element of a somewhat over enlisted tribe might be eliminated, and their replacement by trans-border Mohmands has been suggested.

#### Establishment

The establishment of the Kurram Militia is 5 British officers and 1341 Indian ranks, and the organization is on a platoon basis. The establishment includes a Gun Detachment and two 10-pounder guns.

#### PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE KURRAM MILITIA

- Parachinar Approximately 12 platoons of infantry and two platoons of mounted infantry.
- Kharlachi 1 platoon of infantry
- Lakka Tiga 1½ platoons of infantry
- Alizai 1½ platoons of infantry
- Shakardara ½ platoon of infantry

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Sadda       | 1 platoon of infantry   |
| Badama      | 1 platoon of infantry. Badama commands the exit of the Khurmana valley  |
| Arawali     | 1 platoon of infantry. There is a Royal Air Force aerodrome at Arawali. |
| Manduri     | 1 platoon of infantry   |
| Chapri      | ½ platoon of infantry   |
| Wucha Dara  | ½ platoon of infantry   |
| Teri Mangal | ½ platoon of infantry   |

**Footnote.**

Extracted from the *Oman Daily Observer*, Thursday 30<sup>th</sup> January 2003.

*Tribal Romeo, Juliet sparks deadly battle*

PESHAWAR — Rival tribes in Pakistan's rugged north west border belt have been battling each other on mountain peaks with rockets, missiles and heavy machine guns for two days in a dispute sparked by a forbidden romance, residents and officials said yesterday.

"Fighting started when a woman of one tribe ran away [with] her boyfriend from the other tribe," Hajji Nazir, an elder of the tribal district of North Waziristan, said over phone. "In response the woman's tribe kidnapped two women from the other tribe." The Wazir and Mahsood sub-tribes had launched battles in the inaccessible Shawal area of North Waziristan, in remote mountains 175 kilometres south of the main north-western city of Peshawar, on Tuesday.

"Both tribes are using heavy arms including ground to ground missiles, rockets, heavy machine guns and other sophisticated heavy arms," an official from the North Waziristan administration in Miran Shah said by phone.

The warring tribes had taken up positions on mountain tops, Nazir said. The local jirga or council of elders had been unable to halt the fighting.

"We sent 60 members of the Jirga into the area but they failed to reach it as all the routes have been closed by heavy snowfalls," senior administration official Naeem Anwar said by phone. "We have no access to this far-flung tribal area and we are trying to solve the problem with the help of local elders." North Waziristan resident Najab Wazir said five people had been killed in the fighting. Officials were unable to confirm any casualties because of the remoteness of the area. —AFP

***Clearly the days of the jezail, Martini Henry and Lee Enfield have gone forever! – Tim Ash.***

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## NAVAL MISCELLANY

Maitland Thornton

The following two extracts might be of interest to members. The first is from *MARINER'S MIRROR*, 1913, Vol. 3, p377.

### UNIFORMS, EAST INDIA COMPANY'S SERVICE

It was resolved, at a Committee of Shipping held on March 10<sup>th</sup>, 1802, that in future the uniform to be worn by the mates of the East India Company's regular ships, and also by the masters and mates of extra ships, should be as follows:

**MATES OF REGULAR SHIPS:** - Chief mate, blue coat, black velvet lapels, cuffs and collar, with one small button on each cuff; buttons to be gilt, with the Company's crest. Second mate, a similar uniform with two small buttons on each cuff. Third mate, a similar uniform with three small buttons on each cuff. Fourth mate, a similar uniform with four small buttons on each cuff.

**EXTRA SHIPS:** - Master, blue coat, black velvet lapels, cuffs and collar, with one embroidered button hole on each cuff, and on each side of the collar, buttons gilt, with the Company's crest. Chief mate, blue coat, single-breasted, with black velvet collar and cuffs, and one small button on each cuff; buttons gilt, with the Company's crest. Second mate, a similar uniform with two small buttons on each cuff. Third mate, a similar uniform with three small buttons on each cuff.

The second item is from *Army and Navy Illustrated*, 2 April, 1897.

### THE INDIAN HARBOUR DEFENCE FORCE

In addition to the regular sea-going squadron of cruisers and gun-boats maintained at all times in commission on the East Indies Station, and relieved periodically direct from England, there is a special squadron designed for the purpose of harbour defence which is specially maintained by the Supreme Government of India, with headquarters at Bombay. This force, while under the general command of the Rear-Admiral in charge of the East Indies Station, has a separate existence of its own for purposes of administration, under the charge of a Captain R.N. as senior officer responsible for the Naval defence of India. The force, which is colloquially called the "Indian Marine," comprises, at the present time, two small double-turreted coastal defence ironclads: the "Magdala", of 3,340 tons, armoured with a complete belt of from 4-in. to 8-in. iron, carrying four 8-in. breech-loaders, two in each turret, with seven machine guns and two boat guns; the "Abyssinia", of 2,930 tons, completely belted with from 6 to 7-in. iron, and mounting the same armament as the "Magdala"; two modern first-class gun-boats of the torpedo-boat-catcher type, the "Plassy" and the "Assaye", twin-screw 19 knot vessels, of 735 tons, each armed with quick-firers; and seven torpedo-boats—three, the "Pathan," "Karen," and "Baloochi" of 23 knots, and carrying quick-firers so as to be available as destroyers; one of 21 knots, the "Gurka" and three 95-ton torpedo-boats of 20 knots speed. The two armour-clads, the "Magdala" (at the present moment in commission as the flag-ship of the Defence Force) and the "Abyssinia" were built in 1869 and completed in 1870, from which latter year, in fact, the present force dates its institution and regular organisation for modern purposes. The special idea of the force

is for local defence in Indian waters, and keeping off stray hostile cruisers which might threaten the Indian ports with a view to requisitions under menace of bombardment.

It was the policy of the Government of India, even in the days of the "Hon. John Company" to maintain a small marine force of its own for the special protection of the coasts of India. This was begun to be done as long ago as the days of CLIVE, in the middle of the last century, when the Indian Government first set on foot the force known to our grandfathers by the name of the "Bombay Marine" for the special purpose of keeping down the pirate flotillas from the Persian Gulf and the Malabar coast, whose depredations, during the greater part of the last century and down to between sixty and seventy years ago, caused a reign of terror in Eastern waters. The "Bombay Marine" at the beginning of the present century, had grown into quite a respectable force of small frigates and cruisers flying the Company's flag, commanded by a Commodore, and officered by a corps of officers, with grades almost exactly as in the Royal Naval Service of the time on which the Service was modelled, all commissioned by the Hon. East India Company, and manned by European sailors (with an auxiliary lascar service) and a native force of Marines under European officers. This last body, indeed, is still in existence, having been transformed into the present 21st Regiment of Bombay Infantry, which, in addition to bearing its old title of the "Marine Battalion" to this day, also commemorates its original functions in the regimental badge and motto, designed in imitation of the badge and motto of the Royal Marines - an anchor and laurel wreath, with a motto in Hindustani corresponding to the "Per Mare per Terram" of our own "Royal Jollies". For Naval services on the Coromandel coast of Southern India a somewhat similarly constituted battalion also exists to the present day in the 9<sup>th</sup> Madras Native Infantry, raised at Madeira in 1765, who bear, as commemorative badge, a galley with the motto "*Kooshkee Wee Turee*". For the support of the Bombay Marine, also, the East India Company kept up a large and admirably-equipped dockyard at Bombay. During the first half of the present century, in addition to the Bombay force, a flotilla of cruisers was maintained by the Company in the Bay of Bengal, including several steam cruisers, which rendered good service in conjunction with the ships of the Royal Navy on the East Indies station, in suppressing piracy in the Straits of Malacca, and in the various expeditions against Burmah, down to forty years ago, when, on the supersession of the East India Company by the Imperial Government, the Indian Marine, together with the Indian Army, came directly under the authority of the British Crown.

At the present time, of course, there is, in addition to the war vessels of the Indian Defence Forces of which we have spoken above, a small fleet of special service, trooping, and despatch vessels, with which, however, we are not here concerned.

The crews (who man the vessels of the present Indian Harbour Defence) consist of about one-half British seamen, stokers, and marines of the Royal Navy, specially told off for the service under a number of British Naval officers; the other half of native lascars, raised from among the seafaring population of the Malabar coast. These last, in time of war, would, from their natural ability to stand the heat, be principally relied on for carrying on the work to be done in the confined spaces of the citadels, shell rooms, and magazines in the ironclad turret-ships, in attending to the shot and ammunition supplies, and in working below in the gunboats and torpedo-boats. At general quarters they also man the machine guns on the upper deck. Great attention is paid at all times to their training, both with the Nordenfelts and at small arm exercise, the instruction being carried out under the supervision of British Naval gunnery instructors. To insure attention to the prejudices of the lascars in the matter of food, they have their own native cooks on board.

The British seamen and marines attached to the Indian Harbour Defence flotilla would, in action, be mainly employed in connection with the handling of the heavy ordnance in the turrets and in helping to supervise the work of the lascars.

I would be interested to learn further details about this service and, in particular, relevant dates.

Maitland Thornton.

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#### THE MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL



Squadron Leader Rana Chhina  
at the U.S.I. in Delhi  
photographed in February 2003 wearing his medal

photos by David A.W. Redl



The MacGregor Memorial Medal was instituted by the USI Council at its meeting held on 3 July 1888 to commemorate the memory of Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, KCB, CSI, CIE, founder of the United Service Institution of India. It was intended that the medal should be awarded annually for the best military reconnaissance, journey of exploration or survey in remote areas of India, or countries bordering or under the jurisdiction of India, which produced new information of value for the defence of India. There were occasions when no awards were made in a particular year, but in general two awards were made each year, provided the criteria for the award had been met: to a British or Indian officer (including VCOs), a standard size silver medal; to an NCO or soldier, British or Indian, a reduced size silver medal plus a gratuity, usually Rs.100. For especially valuable work a gold medal might be awarded, either in place of one of the above silver medals or in addition to the two silver medals awarded for that year. During the first one hundred years of the award – 1889 to 1989 – the following awards were made:

7 gold medals, all awarded to officers.

59 standard size silver medals were awarded to 58 officers (one officer gained two awards)

From 1889 to 1944 48 reduced size silver medals were awarded to NCOs and soldiers, 11 of which were designated "special awards" and did not carry a gratuity.

As mentioned in the last edition of DURBAR, the USI Council expanded the scope for the award in October 1986 and again confirmed this decision in December 1994.

The accompanying photographs clearly show the obverse of the medal - a high relief bust of Sir Charles in uniform, facing left. Around the circumference, in capital letters, the inscription MAJOR GENERAL SIR CHARLES MACGREGOR. K.C.B. C.S.I. C.I.E. IN MEMORIAM 1887. The

reverse has a high relief group of six military men in uniform. One is a British officer, one a Gurkha, one a mounted lancer and the other three apparently infantrymen.

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MRS L. A. STARR

J. M. A. Tamplin

Mrs L. A. Starr, mentioned by Peter Chapman in the Summer 2001 Durbar, page 78 ("It's Tuesday") was a remarkable woman. A detailed article on her was published in the Orders and Medals Research Society Journal of Spring 1978 at page 42 by J. D. Sainsbury. She died on 5 January 1977 aged 91. She was born on 30 June 1885, at Dalhousie, Lilian Agnes Wade, daughter of the Revd. T. R. Wade. Educated in England, she qualified as a nurse at the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital. She returned to India in 1913 for the Church Missionary Society. Here she married Dr. V. H. Starr. He was murdered by Pathans on the doorstep of their home. After service with the Q.A.I.M.N.S. in Egypt, she returned to the C.M.S. Hospital at Peshawar in 1920.

In 1925 occurred the incident which rang around the world at that time. On April 14th Afridi tribesmen raided the cantonment at Kohat, murdered the wife of Major J. V. Ellis, D.S.O., Border Regt., seized his 17 year old daughter Molly and carried her off to a village in the heart of the Tirah. After delicate negotiations in which Mrs Starr was closely involved together with Khan Bahadur Moghal Baz Khan, I.O.M., I.D.S.M. (an Afridi officer of the Guides) and Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan (Assistant Political Officer at Kurram), Molly Ellis was released.

Very shortly afterwards, Mrs Starr was awarded the Kaiser-i-Hind 1st Class (L.G. 1 May 1923), and subsequently, a month later, a Bar to the Medal (L.G. 2 June 1923).

Khan Bahadur Moghal Baz Khan, I.O.M., I.D.S.M., and Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan were each awarded the Kaiser-i-Hind 1st Class (L.G. 25 May 1925, 'to be dated 14 May 1923').

As disclosed above, Moghal Baz Khan had the I.O.M. and the I.D.S.M, the latter notified in GGO 536/1907. He was also a recipient of the (small) MacGregor Medal; this is listed in Major R. Hammond's History (published 1995) as Daffadar Moghal Baz, Q.O. Corps of Guides, awarded 1904. Rana Chhina, in his recently published I.D.S.M. Roll, records he was also an O.B.E.

Subsequently Mrs Starr was awarded the Life Saving Medal in Gold of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; the Bronze Medals were awarded to the two Indians.

Mrs Starr was remarried to Lt.-Colonel G. E. C. Underhill, 1<sup>st</sup> Punjabis, in 1924. He retired in 1929 and they moved to Surrey. During the War Mrs Starr was in charge of the Civil Defence First Aid Post at Wrecclesham.

(see also page 262 of R.V.E. Hodson's *The Story & Gallantry of the North West Frontier 1849-1947*, which is reviewed on page 77, for a mention of the Molly Ellis incident. Ed.)

## INTELLIGENCE IN INDIA 1930-47

Shortly before he died in November 2000, the late Lieutenant Colonel Tony Mains offered me an article on intelligence in India. Some of the material had been used in his books but I have extracted that which I thought had not been used and which remains of interest. Ed.

### MILITARY INTELLIGENCE - PRE-WAR

It seems incredible today to realise that there were no intelligence units or personnel in India other than staff officers at Army HQ and battalion intelligence officers. Intelligence in Army HQ was the responsibility of a combined "Directorate of Operations and Intelligence", under a Brigadier as Director. The total staff consisted of a Deputy Director, one GSO I, seven GSO IIs, eleven GSO IIIs, one attached officer and two interpreter officers. The actual division of the staff between the two functions is not given in the Army Lists but it is unlikely that more than half were involved in intelligence. Army Lists show no intelligence staff officers in Command, District or Brigade HQs. Staffs were very small in those days - a Command having a Brigadier General Staff (BGS), a GSO II and a GSO III - Districts, a GSO I a GSO II and sometimes a GSO III - a Brigade, a Brigade Major only. Intelligence work was usually undertaken by the junior-most general staff officer, who had invariably passed the Staff College (psc), but who had had no specialised Intelligence training,

It was possible for District and Brigade Commanders to pull in extra officers as attaches general staff or Brigade intelligence officers, and this was usual in Frontier brigades: Landi Kotal Brigade had one such in 1939. These officers were not graded staff officers but "Extra Regimentally Employed" and received no extra staff pay.

Each battalion or cavalry regiment had an intelligence section of some six other ranks under a Sergeant/Havildar. During exercises or on the Frontier, a junior subaltern in British units or the Educational Jemadar (a regimental Viceroy's Commissioned Officer), in Indian units, acted as unit intelligence officer.

### ROYAL AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE

The RAF had an important role in backing up the Army on Frontier operations, both in flying reconnaissance missions and in bombing the villages of hostiles. To promote the necessary close liaison, a number of army officers were attached to the RAF as "Air Intelligence Liaison Officers" (AILOs), whose main roles were liaison and photographic interpretation. They were usually graduates of a Command Intelligence Course.

### CIVIL AND POLICE INTELLIGENCE

The Government of India's Intelligence Bureau. This was the most important intelligence organisation and was located at Delhi with branch bureaux at Peshawar and Quetta. The Director was a police officer, as were the bulk of the staff, but army officers were employed at Peshawar and Quetta. It had two main functions - to gather intelligence across and along the land frontiers of India with particular reference to the North West Frontier, Afghanistan and Tibet, and, secondly, to counter subversion within India. It was comparable thus to both MI 5 and MI 6 in Britain.

Police Intelligence. All provincial police forces of British India, as well as the separate forces of the Presidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, maintained efficient intelligence units within the police structure, but at headquarters rather than district level. These maintained close liaison with the Intelligence Bureau.

Military Intelligence Officers (MIOs). The widespread anti-Government agitation of the early thirties led to the appointment of Military Intelligence Officers in the more sensitive areas. These were army officers, who had attended a Command Intelligence Course, seconded to the civil police, who gave them the police rank of Additional Superintendent; an officer with the police powers of a Superintendent, but who was not in charge of a district. They carried out liaison between the army and the police and also acted as "Field Agents" of the Intelligence Bureau.

#### TRAINING - PRE WAR

There was no intelligence school or other centralised training agency. Each Command ran a number of "Command Intelligence Courses" of about two weeks duration. The syllabus was theoretically large, but the real object was to earmark AILOs and MIOs rather than train officers to fill army intelligence posts. It was difficult to get officers to volunteer for these courses as intelligence was considered a backwater, and absence from regimental duty was held to have an adverse effect on an officer's career. There is no doubt that the best officers wishing to take up civil employment attempted to enter the Indian Political Service, which offered permanent civil employment at much higher pay than the army, while its members retained their army rank and continued to be promoted on time scale up to Lieutenant Colonel.

#### 1935 TO 1940

There was little expansion in this period, although in 1938, HQ Northern Command acquired a GSO III (AILO) and two AILOs; this was due to the activities of the Faqir of Ipi on the North West Frontier and not to the worsening world situation. India did not mobilise any of the four Divisions of the Field Army on the outbreak of war, but considerable forces were sent to the Middle East from Southern Command. These forces, which were the nucleus of the 4th and 5<sup>th</sup> Indian Divisions, were provided with intelligence and security personnel by the British Army,

Preparations were made by India during 1940 to provide a self-contained force, should it be required, to operate and guard the L of C between Basra and Egypt, allowed for under the Britain-Iraq Defence Treaty. Intelligence and security personnel were earmarked but this force was never sent.

#### 1941

In this year the Operations and Intelligence Directorate in Army HQ was reorganised into two separate Directorates. The first Director of Military Intelligence was Major General W.L. Cawthorne, a post which he occupied with great distinction until nearly the end of British rule.

The Indian Intelligence School opened at Karachi in January 1941 with three instructors - Major J. Campbell, RIASC, Commandant, and Instructor Class B, and Captains Majumdar, 16th Light Cavalry, and Mains, 9th Gurkha Rifles, (myself) as Instructors Class C. There was no administrative staff except for two British clerks, and little or no equipment, so the instructional staff were hampered in preparing for the first course by having to deal with administrative problems. Major Campbell had previous intelligence experience, Majumdar had been an AILO, but I had no practical experience as

yet. The course concentrated on operational and air intelligence up to the level of a GSO III (I) of a Division. There was no instruction in security, and, indeed, there was no one in India who had any knowledge of the subject. An Indian Wing was opened in April, but this and the whole School's activities were much hindered by the posting away of instructors and potential instructors to Iraq.

Iraq Force, (later PAI Force/10th Army). A large force was sent to Iraq in April of this year to deal with the Raschid Ali rebellion in that country. This was the first of the two theatres of war, the other being Burma, which were the responsibility of Army HQ India, who, therefore, had to supply both the troops and the staff. By the end of the year the intelligence staff of HQ Iraq Force consisted of a GSO I, with an I (a) and I(b) section (see page 72 for designations) each with a GSO II and a GSO III, together with intelligence and interpreter officers. Four Composite Field Security Sections were raised, together with two all Indian Divisional sections; these would become the first sections of the Indian Intelligence Corps. There was also the Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq (CICI) which absorbed the existing RAF intelligence set up. There was much duplication and some friction between CICI and GS I(b) Iraq Force until their respective functions were properly defined.

1942

Malaya was a War Office responsibility, although the bulk of the troops (two Divisions) were from India. As far as I know there were no Field Security Sections with these Divisions.

On the outbreak of the war with Japan, India was given responsibility for the forces in Burma. The intelligence staff, provided in the main by officers sent from India, consisted of a GSO I, with a GSO II and a GSO III for I(a) and I(b) respectively, a GSO II for I(c) and a GSO III for I(x). There were no FS Sections - four sections (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Burma Composite) were raised during the Retreat, and duly arrived back in India.

Meanwhile in India, HQ Northern Command now had four GSO IIIs (AILO), but Eastern Command intelligence staff was increased to a GSO I, two GSO IIs, and one GSO III (AILO) to counter the Japanese threat. Southern Command still had no intelligence staff.

Up to now there were no FS Sections of the Indian Intelligence Corps, but, in mid-1942, all sections were numbered on a common roll, so the Iraq Composite and Burma Composite Sections lost their separate entities. A new HQ, (HQ 4 Corps) arrived from England to command the troops facing the Japanese on the Burma border in Assam. They had their own "I" staff and an (all British) FS Section and absorbed a number of the Burma Army "I" staff.

1943

By the end of this year all Formation HQs had large intelligence staffs. HQ Eastern Army (later in the year to be split into HQ 14th Army and HQ Eastern Command) was typical with:

One GSO I (Chief Intelligence Officer).

I (a) Section.

One GSO II

One GSO III

I (b) Section.

One GSO II

One GSO III

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I (x) Section.

One GSO III

together with a number of IOs.

HQ 14th Army had a similar staff, together with staff officers attached for GS I(d), GS I(s) and GS I(z). In addition both the RAF and US Army had one security officer attached.

On the L of C, HQ 202 L of C Area (Assam) had:-

One GSO II (Chief Intelligence Officer).

I (a) Section,

One GSO III

One IO.

I (b) Section.

One GSO III

One IO.

1944 ONWARDS

From now on all formation HQs on the 14th Army and Eastern Command L of C had intelligence staffs. All Indian Areas (old Districts) had a GSO III (I) and all Sub Areas (old Brigade Areas) a Brigade Intelligence Officer.

After the war, HQ Central Command (India) had:-

One GSO II (Chief Intelligence Officer and Commander Indian Intelligence Corps, Central Command)

One GSO II I (b),

One GSO II I (a).

Two IOs.

THE INDIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS

The Indian Intelligence Corps for practical purposes came into being in 1942, when Lieutenant Colonel J.C. de Vine, Intelligence Corps took over the Indian Wing of the Intelligence School as Commandant, Indian Intelligence Corps and Chief Instructor F.S. Wing. This expanded into the Indian Intelligence Corps Depot. The Indian Wing had only trained IORs for F.S. Sections; the new Wing would train both BORs and IORs in security duties as well as being a holding and records unit. It remained under the Commandant of the Intelligence School, now Colonel G.T. Wards, which continued to run intelligence courses for officers.

A long delayed and very necessary move came in 1943, when all intelligence staff officers and IOs were attached to the Indian Intelligence Corps. There was a considerable wastage of trained "I" officers who often went back to regimental duty for a variety of reasons. Up to now there had been three categories of officers employed in Intelligence viz;

British Service regimental officers.

Indian Army regimental officers.

Intelligence Corps officers.

The third category, on leaving an intelligence appointment, returned to the depot at Karachi for reposting in intelligence, but the other two categories were sent to reinforcement camps and regimental centres, who promptly reposted them to regimental duty, from which it was often difficult to retrieve them. Now details of all officers attached to the Indian Intelligence Corps would be known to the Director of Military Intelligence (D.M.I) at Army HQ and to the Depot, and arrangements could be made to prevent them drifting back to regimental duty.

A difficulty arose over the commissioning of British FS NCOs as Field Security Officers. There was a good deal of officer material in FS Sections and the I (b) Staffs encouraged FSOs to recommend such for commissions. They could not be commissioned directly into the Indian Intelligence Corps, but only into Indian units, so such NCOs were told to keep in touch with their old FSOs, while they were at Officer Training Schools (Indian OCTUs), so that, after commissioning, they could be sent to Karachi for attachment to the Indian Intelligence Corps. It was unfortunate that a number never got past the Selection Boards, as, when asked, they gave their unit preference as Intelligence Corps or Field Security Service. This was taken as lacking in sufficient war like spirit to make a good officer. When this became known, instructions were given that these men should be treated differently from others.

There was a hard core of experienced "I" officers of GSO I grade and the Intelligence School could turn out competent intelligence officers, and even GSO IIIs, for I (a) work, but there was an acute shortage of GSO IIs and IIIs for I (b). Of the few that existed, many were British Service officers, who had neither the knowledge of the Indian scene nor language essential for security work. Indian and Gurkha units who, by 1943 had been severely "milked", were crying out for officers experienced in the languages and customs of their men. An Indian Army Commission was set up to investigate the state of the Army after the Malaya and Burma debacles and it reported that it was essential to return experienced, particularly regular, officers back to active units. This led to a number of square pegs in round holes, as the Military Secretary's Branch was apt to treat all branches of intelligence as the same and intelligence officers as interchangeable. It was not unusual to find a GSO III, versed in I (a) work upgraded to a GSO II (Ib), merely because he was the most senior or the most readily available.

All Chief Intelligence Officers in Commands were recognised as "Commanders Intelligence Corps", like Commanders RA or RE. They had the right now, with the concurrence of their GOC in C's, to transfer GSO IIIs, IOs and FSOs within the Command, without having to obtain the sanction of MI Directorate or MS Branch at Army HQ.

#### INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATIONS

General Staff (Intelligence). In the early days of the war there were the four conventional sections of GS(I) – GS I(a) – operational intelligence, GS I(b) – security, GS I(c) – censorship and press, and GS I(x) intelligence administration. As the war progressed other sections were added - GS I(d) - deception, GS I (e) – interrogation, GS I(s) - signal security, though this became a highly technical matter and so was removed from GS I and put into the Signals Branch, and GS I(z) – the staff side of Z Force.

The Burma Intelligence Corps. A Corps of guides and interpreters formed after the Burma retreat from soldiers of the Burma Army, who had retreated into India. Quite separate from the Indian Intelligence Corps.

Civil Security adviser 14th Army/Eastern Command. A retired Inspector General of the Bengal Police, Sir Douglas Gordon, was appointed to this post when 14th Army was formed in the autumn of

1943. He operated from Calcutta and was the liaison link between 14<sup>th</sup> Army/Eastern Command and the police of Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and the Calcutta Town police.

Commander in Chief's Josh (Morale) Group. Auchinleck deputed three senior Indian officers (Colonels) to investigate and watch the morale of Indian troops, by touring the various formations and reporting personally to the C in C. They maintained close contact when on tour with the local I (b) staffs.

Gauhati Intelligence Department. This was a part of I (b) IV Corps situated in Gauhati, in 1942, to oversee security on the Assam L of C, while the Corps I (b) staff dealt with the forward areas. It was absorbed into the "I" staff of No 202 L of C Area in the spring of 1943.

No 615 Field Security Section. This section of an officer and sergeant major only was raised in 1942 to work with the Chinese (American) forces in the Ledo District of Assam. The FSO was commissioned direct from the Assam Oil Co at Digboi, on account of his local knowledge of the area, and the sergeant major had served in the Hong Kong Police.

Iraq Field Security Special Branch. Staffed by Intelligence Corps BORs with European languages, they worked the railway from Istanbul to Baghdad, one of the two routes to and from German occupied Europe.

Military Intelligence Officers. MIOs under the Intelligence Bureau continued to be appointed in major cities such as Bombay and Calcutta. Unlike the pre-war MIOs, who were regular officers, they were now usually businessmen commissioned direct without any military training and often continuing to reside (with their families) in their pre-war accommodation.

Special Intelligence units. A number of these, both British and American, operated secretly in Eastern India. Their excessive secrecy caused problems for the security staffs and the Field Security.

"V" Force. The frontier between India and Burma, consisting of high mountains and dense jungle, was not a continuous battle field and was wide open to infiltrators. Luckily the semi civilised tribes people – Nagas, Kukis, and Lushais who inhabited the area were anti -Japanese and ready to cooperate with the British authorities. Quite soon after the Burma retreat, to guard against infiltrators, villages were grouped under civil or military officers. In many cases this was done under the aegis of the para military Assam Rifles or Eastern Frontier Rifles, but in one case, the North Cachar Watch and Ward, the originator and co-ordinator was a lady anthropologist. These spontaneous and uncoordinated groups were later brought together under military command and became "V" Force. There was close liaison between them and Intelligence.

"Z" Force. There was no intelligence organisation left behind in Burma after the retreat, probably because, as Burma had been a British possession, no one had thought to do so. Indeed in the summer of 1942, intelligence from Japanese-held Burma was almost nil, and it could be said with some truth that we knew more of what was happening in Tokyo or Berlin than in Rangoon. "Z" Force, which was largely the creation of the DMI India, Cawthorne, was formed from refugees from Burma - officers from the Burma Army, civil, police and forest officers, together with ex-employees of the European timber companies. These men went back into Burma, to collect and transmit information; they were known as "Z" Force, and the staff who controlled them as GS I(z). The operation was a great success.

**Notes.**

1. Although South East Asia Command (SEAC) and its Army Group came into being in 1943 and commanded 14th Army, the administration of intelligence as well as other administration remained with India Command until after the re-capture of Burma. In 1942, Army HQ India was re-designated GHQ India, but the term Army HQ has been used throughout as it reflects the War Office/Ministry of Defence functions of this Headquarters. The Commander in Chief, as the Defence Member of the Viceroy's Council was, in effect, India's Defence Minister, administering British units on the Indian Establishment, the Indian Army, the Royal Indian Navy, RAF units on the Indian Establishment, and the Royal Indian Air Force.

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## LETTERS AND QUERIES

● Tim Ash writes:

Major General Chand N Das has quite correctly pointed out the error I made in my note on the Delhi Durbar Medal 1903 inscription (Durbar Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter 2003, page 125). There is indeed no word *5. br!* As the General has pointed out the '*r*' is a letter of Edward and the *dot* from the letter *nun* of the word Hind. My apologies.

● Ernest Gardner writes:

The article by Tim Ash on the NW Frontier Forces caught my eye and perhaps I can add a bit to it. I was in those parts in 1995 on a tour led by the late John Gaylor and Ashok Nath. Our tour began in Delhi where we visited many sites associated with the Mutiny. The monuments erected to our dead had been defaced and one, for example, bore the Hindi inscription 'Praise to the Freedom Fighters'. As another example of the changing scene a British cemetery had, with the obvious connivance of the authorities, been built on by Christian 'squatters' who made us very welcome and gave us tea. In contrast, when we got up to the Frontier a very different atmosphere prevailed. There is still the Handyside Arch and his memorial tablet still not defaced. Although we had been advised to keep a low profile, once the garrison of Fort Handyside found out who we were they opened the gates, invited us for tea and put on an exhibition of local dances. It was all in marked contrast to the monuments we had seen defaced in Delhi.

● I have been sent the picture of a police group with a request for help in identifying the police force.



Can anyone help, perhaps by reference to the fez-like (?Parsee) headdress? Answers, please, to the Editor.

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## BOOK NOTES AND REVIEWS

● *THE STORY & GALLANTRY OF THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER 1849-1947*. R.V.E. Hodson. Southampton: Clio Publishing, 2002. Card covers, 412 pages, maps, illustrations, glossary, bibliography. £20. ISBN 0-9542650-0-9.

Twenty years ago, when my interest in Indian military history was in its infancy, I was enormously grateful to Robin Hodson for his excellent series of articles under the same title as this book which appeared in the now defunct *Military Chest*, a bi-monthly magazine. Sadly, when that publication folded after just twenty-four issues, and was subsumed into the monthly *Medal News*, Robin's articles, now under the title "Gallantry", appeared only twice as far as I have been able to ascertain, combined in this book into one chapter. Always thoroughly researched, and packed with much data, including individual awards for gallantry, these articles became a cornerstone for further research into specific aspects of the military history of the North West Frontier. Their re-publication in this single volume is to be warmly welcomed, therefore, since I doubt there will be many, especially amongst newcomers to the subject, who will easily be able to access archive copies of *Military Chest* or *Medal News*.

Moreover, this is not an exact reprint. Chapters 1 to 22 are virtually identical to the first 22 parts of the *Military Chest* articles. The next two chapters, dealing with the 'Redshirt' troubles and the Afridi invasion of Peshawar, both in 1930, now usefully divide what had been one article in *Military Chest*. The chapter on the 1934-35 period combines the two articles that I recall from *Medal News*, but this leaves a further ten chapters which are completely new to me.

The first five chapters of the book serve as an introduction to the subject as a whole and cover a description of the North West Frontier, the pre-Mutiny period and expeditions (1849-1857), the Close Border Policy (1857-1878), and the Forward Policy (1880-1896). Read as individual articles twenty years ago, or now as individual chapters, they provide informative and useful background, but put together in a book they do not make easy reading and seem to jump around from one period to another. While reading the book I was constantly searching in vain for maps to help place the narrative in context. When subsequently comparing it to the earlier *Military Chest* articles I re-discovered numerous maps that have been omitted from this reprint. A pity, since their inclusion would, I think, have been of greater value than some of the pictures of individuals, or of rather non-descript rocky outcrops with a few camels trotting by.

The book becomes much easier to follow from Chapter 6 onwards, with chapters dealing with individual campaigns such as the Hunza Nagar Campaign 1891, the Siege and Relief of Chitral 1895, Tirah 1897, the First World War and the Third Afghan War 1919. By and large these are verbatim copies of the earlier *Military Chest* articles, though Chapter 9 – The Pathan Revolt 1897, contains some new material on three Victoria Cross awards for gallantry at the village of Bilot on 16 September; Chapter 16 – The War Years 1914-1918, contains new detailed material about the role of 21<sup>st</sup> (Empress of India's) Lancers in the cavalry action around Shabkadr on 5 September 1915; and Chapter 18 – The Waziristan Campaign November 1919-May 1920 contains some new detail. I have no reference to chapters 27 onwards having previously been published. They cover in detail the events in Waziristan in 1936 and 1937 when the Faqir if Ipi caused the British much trouble (seven chapters), the last years of British rule, and a final chapter on the 1<sup>st</sup> Afridi Battalion.

There is certainly one instance in Chapter 12 – The Withdrawal from Tirah and reoccupation of the Khyber Posts, where the original text has not been accurately copied. The first paragraph of page 135 should refer to the award of the Distinguished Conduct Medal to various British soldiers, not the Indian Order of Merit. But this is the only glaring inconsistency I found in an otherwise admirable work.

I take issue with one section of the book – Chapter 7, The Siege of Chitral 1895. The author refers on page 58 to the Chitral garrison comprising, amongst others, "301 Kashmir Infantry of doubtful quality except for a leavening of Gurkhas". Towards the end of the chapter, having described the gallantry exhibited in both the defence and relief of Chitral, he makes a passing reference to the defenders of the Fort being awarded many decorations, but offers no details, whereas other sections of the book name the regiments. For the sake of completeness, therefore, it is worth noting that 22 members of 4<sup>th</sup> Kashmir Rifles were awarded the IOM 3<sup>rd</sup> Class for the Defence of Chitral, one of whom was subsequently advanced to 2<sup>nd</sup> Class, one member of 4<sup>th</sup> Kashmir Rifles and two members of 1<sup>st</sup> Kashmir Mountain Battery were similarly awarded IOM 3<sup>rd</sup> Class for action during the march to relieve Chitral, and a further three would have received the award had they lived (their widows were admitted to the pension of the Order). Hardly of doubtful quality, I would suggest.

But let that not detract from what must be an indispensable book on the shelf of any serious student of the military history of the North West Frontier. It is a book that will, I think, be returned to time and time again.

ANM

● *THE BRITISH-INDIAN ARMY 1860-1914*. Peter Duckers. Princes Risborough: Shire Publications Ltd., 2003. Card covers, 56 pages, maps, illustrations. £5.99. ISBN 0-7478-0550-4.

Another of the now familiar short introductions to a subject, this time the Indian Army, offered by Peter Duckers and published by Shire Publications. Essentially it covers the whole range of Indian military history between the stated dates, in a couple of paragraphs per subject – John Company's Army, after the Mutiny, Presidency Armies, officers, other ranks, Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, PFF, Gurkhas, Militia, Princely States, Volunteers, frontier service, overseas service, orders, decorations and medals etc. Nicely produced, I doubt it will say anything that is new to members of this Society, but as with his other books it serves as a useful and affordable, though very brief, introduction to the subject.

● *CHINESE ARMORIAL PORCELAIN, Volume II*. David S Howard. Chippenham: Heirloom & Howard Ltd., 2003. 904 pages, 1,980 illustrations (95% in colour), slip case. ISBN 0-9544389-0-6 (cloth bound) £480; ISBN 0-9544389-1-4 (leather bound) £680.

Perhaps of passing interest only to members of this Society, this is a companion volume to that published thirty years ago, occasioned by the enormous amount of material identified since that first publication. The specialist porcelain trade with China, an integral part of the commercial success of 18<sup>th</sup> century Britain, was handled almost exclusively by private traders working within the framework of the East India Company. The Appendices include a list of Chairmen and Directors of HEIC 1708-1820, Governors of Madras 1681-1810, Governors of Bombay 1710-1810, Governors of Bengal 1689-1810, Captains and Managing Owners of East Indiamen from England to Canton 1709-1802 and Bombay Country Ships 1790-1833.

