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"FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA" - compiled in the Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters, India

Shamus O D Wade

This monumental work describes every border and overseas expedition between 1762 and 1907 plus additional information on operations against the Mohmands in 1908 and the Abor Expedition of 1911 and 1912. If you want to know who took part in a particular expedition, the information is quite simple to find. Set in different type, and accompanying most combat accounts, is a list of all the units engaged (including "friendlies" and carriers).

However, if you want to know all the expeditions a particular unit took part in, you may have to plod through all seven volumes from beginning to end. What is needed is for someone (not me) to produce a unit index. Could someone who is good at that sort of thing extract some money from the General Palit Military Studies Trust for the purpose?

To describe the contents of the "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions...." and the history of its production, we had better start with the Preface to Volume I.

PREFACE

In 1866 the Punjab Government considered it desirable that a "Record should be composed of the expeditions made from time to time against the North- Western Frontier Tribes, with such further information as might render the work a valuable guide to those who might have future dealings with these turbulent neighbours." The first edition of the work was compiled in 1873 by Colonel W H Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry, under the title "A Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes", and was revised and brought up to date in 1884 by Lieutenant A H Mason, RE.

Similar considerations have now prompted a compilation of a record of expeditions against frontier tribes on all the frontiers of India, and of operations embarked on by the Indian Government overseas; and as the latest edition of Paget and Mason had become out of print, it was decided to incorporate that work, revised and brought up to date, in the present volumes, instead of again issuing it as a separate compilation.

The arrangement adopted in the former work, namely, each tribe being dealt with separately, has been followed in the present instance, but for the sake of convenience the present record has been divided into six volumes, each volume dealing with a distinct geographical division. This division is as follows:-

Vol. I North-West Frontier Tribes north of the Kabul river
Vol. II North-West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal rivers
Vol. III Baluchistan, and the First Afghan War

Vol. IV North and North-Eastern Frontier Tribes
Vol. V Burma
Vol. VI Overseas Expeditions, including Part I, Africa; Part II, Ceylon and the islands of the Indian Ocean; Part III, Arabia and Persia; Part IV, Malay Peninsula and Archipelago; Part V, China.

Of the first three volumes, the accounts dealing with the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan Tribes previous to 1884 have been extracted from Paget and Mason's book, while the history of subsequent operations have been compiled for these volumes by Major O K Tancock, RGA, Major E J M Molynueux DSO, 12th Cavalry, Captain W L Maxwell, 127th Baluch Light Infantry, and Lieutenant C F Aspinall, Royal Munster Fusiliers. The remaining three volumes are new, and of these Volume IV has been compiled by Lieutenant J L Mowbray, RHA, and Volume V by Lieutenant C F Aspinall.

The latter officer has also been responsible for editing Volumes I, II, IV and V. Volume VI has been compiled by Major R G Burton, 94th Russell's Infantry, Major W H Brown, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, Captain R S Phillips, 52nd Sikhs, and Lieutenant G P Morris, 30th Lancers. The general editorship of Volume III and VI has been undertaken by Major R G Burton.

It is especially requested that any errors in these volumes may be brought to the notice of this Division as speedily as possible.

W Malleson, Lieut. Colonel
Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence Division of the Chief of Staff
Simla, 17th September 1907

Everything listed above was published in 1908. An additional Part 2 of Volume I, "Operations against the Mohmands", compiled by Lieutenant R Dane, 21st Cavalry Frontier Force, was published in 1910.

"Official Account of the Abor Expedition" was published in 1913 separately to the preceding six volumes. But, when Mittal Publications of New Delhi reprinted the six volumes in 1983, they added "Official Account....." as Volume III.

Successive articles in this series, to be published in future editions of DURBAR, will give a complete list of all the expeditions in which Indian troops took part and which are dealt with in the seven volumes.

Following on from Tim Wilsey's article about the 24th Foot at Chillianwala (Vol. 15, No 3, Autumn 1998) we have two further contributions on the subject. The first, about "The Chillianwala Table", is based on research carried out over a number of years by our Honorary Member, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Gray OBE, a former officer of Skinner's Horse. The

second draws on a lecture given in 1998 by our member Lieutenant General Kirpal Singh Randhawa PVSM, AVSM under the auspices of The Fateh Foundation, New Delhi.

THE CHILLIANWALA TABLE

"*Rambling Reminiscences of the Punjab Campaign*" by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew John Macpherson, 24th Regiment, states (Chapter VI, page 46):

> "In our Mess tent, on the table around which they had so often sat in mirth and merriment, were reverently laid the bodies of 13 of our officers together with the remains of Sergeant-Major Coffee (commissioned in death).
>
> Her Majesty's 24th Regiment. Battle of Chillianwala. Strength on going into action: Officers 37, Sergeants 46, Corporals 42, Drummers 17, Privates 922. Killed: - 13 Officers, 28 NCOs and men.
>
> Officers killed: - Lt Col R Brookes, Brigadier and Lt Col Pennyquick CB, KH, Major H W Harris, Captains C Lee, R W Travers, C H Harris, J P Shore; Lieutenants G Phillips, O B Payne, J H Woodgate, W Phillips; Ensigns H C O Collis, Alexander Pennyquick".

In 1933 "*The Brittania*", Journal of the Royal Norfolk Regiment, re-published a series of letters from the late 1890s which had appeared in "*The Navy and Army Gazette*" concerning the whereabouts of The Chillianwala Table. 2nd Battalion The Norfolk Regiment had a very large dining table which was claimed to be that used to lay out the bodies of the dead officers of 24th, though it also pointed out that other claims were made in respect of tables at:

> The War Office
> Staff College
> R.A. Mess Rawalpindi
> R.A. Mess Kirkee
> and various tables in the possession of Indian Army regiments.

The first of these letters, by an author who signs only as 'Chillianwala', had referred to dining with the 2/9th (later The Royal Norfolk Regiment), then quartered in Aldershot, which boasted the possession of a fine table large enough to seat 45 persons. It was claimed that this was The Chillianwala Table though, according to the author of the letter, the table "....was not the property of the 24th, but of another British Regiment belonging to the force engaged." The letter sought help in proving the identity of the table and in tracing its history from 1849 to 1874. According to the author of the letter the 2/9th had bought the table in 1874 from the 36th Regiment (later, on amalgamation with 29th Foot, The Worcestershire Regiment) who in turn were said to have bought it in 1868 from the 42nd (later The Black Watch). Its antecedents before 1868 were unknown, though it was rumoured to have belonged at one time to the 61st (later, on amalgamation with 28th Foot, The Gloucestershire Regiment). Since the 61st were present at Chillianwala it was speculated that they may have

been the original possessors of the table when it was requisitioned to lay out the bodies of the dead officers.

In response to this letter Major General G F De Berry, who had served at Chillianwala with the 24th as a Lieutenant, wrote:

> ".....I was the officer of the 24th Foot who, with the sanction of my Commanding Officer (Major Blackford) had the bodies of our late brother officers and sergeant-major killed in action, placed on the Mess table in our Mess tent (which had been given up for the purpose) till I arranged with the Chaplain with the Forces for their proper Christian burial on the mound near the village of Chillianwalah. I believe the table was retained by the 24th Foot all the time the Regiment remained in India. How the table passed out of possession of the 24th Foot I cannot say, as when that Corps quitted India in 1861, I was with the Depot in England."

Another letter, signed by "Fusilier", dated 30 March 1896, claimed that the table had belonged to 104th Bengal Infantry at the time the bodies had been lain on it. It had apparently been sold by an acting Mess President during the temporary absence of the majority of the officers and later passed to the 9th Foot via an unidentified route. Brigadier General Roger Boyle CB CMG, late of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (101st and 104th) wrote in 1930 that Regimental tradition had it that the officers of the 24th had been laid out on their table which had subsequently been sold to the 9th Foot. In light of other information this claim, and the earlier one by 'Fusilier' seem spurious.

In June 1896 Captain J M R Stewart (Black Watch) wrote:

> ".....when I was Brigade Major at Ferozepor in 1859-60, the 24th were kind enough to make me an Hon. Member of their Mess and I dined there every night.....If I remember right, at that time Major Lutman was PMC and.....Capt J Burne was on the Committee.....I remember perfectly well as a fact that tradition in the Regiment that on the table the evening after the battle of Chillianwalah, sixteen (or was it fourteen) of your brother officers were laid dead, side by side and that included the Brigadier (who was your Colonel) and his son. I left the Black Watch and came home in December 1866."

(Note: This claim would seem to support the belief by General De Berry that the table remained with the 24th until they left India. Both Lutman and Burne were survivors of Chillianwala and might have been expected to refute this claim if it had not been based on fact).

OTHER CLAIMS

Correspondence in 1930 about the table in The War Office used by the Army Council shows that it was given in trust to the Army Council by the Leinster Regiment when they were disbanded. Undoubtedly an Indian table, its provenance is in some doubt and the Chillianwala part of its legend was thought in 1930 to be based on hearsay.

Other correspondence in 1930 about the Staff College table showed that it belonged to 1st Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers who had purchased it from a store in about 1870. The author of the letter had never heard it referred to as having a connection with Chillianwala.

In 1931 the RA Mess at Rawalpindi admitted that their claim to the Chillianwala Table was a weak one but thought that R.A Kirkee's claim was better, in that they had bought it from 14th Light Dragoons who in turn had bought it from 24th Foot "on that Regiment going home in 1856". Since 24th Foot did not return to England until 1861 that claim also now seems spurious.

More recently, in the late 1980s, a Chillianwala claim was made on behalf of a table owned by the then Royal Corps of Transport at Buller Barracks, Aldershot. This table had been presented to the old RASC Headquarters in 1926 by General Sir Richard Ewart, KCMG, CB, CIE, DSO. Ewart, born in 1864, was gazetted into the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in 1883 and thence into the Hampshire Regiment before transferring to the Indian Staff Corps in 1886. He became DDST Central Region, India, in 1914 and retired to England in 1919 where he died in 1928. In the year preceding his death he was appointed the first Colonel Commandant of the RIASC. It is not known how he came into possession of the table but legend stated that it had belonged to Skinner's Horse. Indeed, The Journal of the Royal Army Service Corps, No 10. Vol. L, dated October 1926, which recorded the presentation of the table by General Ewart, stated that it "had been the Mess Table of 'Skinner's Horse' before the Mutiny". (There is now a brass plate attached to the table to that effect). The table seats sixteen and has no extra leaves. Douglas Gray, upon whose research notes this article is based, became involved in protracted correspondence with, and visits to, the RCT about this table and has sat as a guest at it. He had been at various times PMC, Mess Secretary and Adjutant of Skinner's Horse and had never seen any regimental records of this table. The Chillianwala claim seems to have been a very late addition to the table's legend and may have started as a result of the publication in 1986 of 'The Hindu Horseman' by Lieutenant Colonel Denzil Holder, formerly of Skinner's Horse, in which he wrote:

> "The assembled company looked splendid round the mess dinner table of dark, almost black, mahogany, loaded with the mess silver ....The table was the Chillianwala table on which, after the battle of that name, the corpses of eleven cavalry (sic) officers were laid out prior to burial".

Where Denzil Holder got this from we will never know - indeed, he may have invented the anecdote to add colour to his book - but, largely as a result of Douglas Gray's efforts, The Regimental Association of the Royal Logistics Corps (into which the RCT has been amalgamated) wrote in 1993 that the Chillianwala connection had been "well and truly put to rest".

Another Skinner's Horse/Chillianwala claim concerned a table supposedly destroyed in a fire during the 1978 Regimental Reunion in Kaluchak (Jammu). Speculation in 1991 suggested that this table may have passed to Skinner's Horse (1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry) when 1st Bengal Light Cavalry was disbanded in 1861 along with other British regiments of Bengal Cavalry. 1st Bengal Light Cavalry had taken part in the Chillianwala action but there is

nothing to suggest it was their Mess table which had been used by the 24th. This part of the story is confusing in its own right. Douglas Gray is clear that there was a Regimental reunion of Skinner's Horse at Jammu in 1978 (he attended), a marquee was erected for a dance and it was destroyed by an accidental fire on the previous night, including some furniture, but not a large Mess table. In any case, he points out that in the days of 1st Irregular Cavalry there were only 6 British officers and they would not have needed a large Mess table. So did such a table exist and, if it was not destroyed in the 1978 fire, where is it now?

The whole story of "The Chillianwala Table" is a confusing one, therefore, and one which will probably never be resolved, but the following conclusions can be drawn:

- There can be no doubt that the bodies of the slain 24th officers, and the RSM, were laid out on the mess table in the mess tent of the 24th (first-hand information of General De Berry and Lt Col Macpherson).
- The legend of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (formerly 104th Bengal Fusiliers) seems ill-founded and the fate of their table irrelevant.
- It is nowhere stated that the mess table of the 24th was their own property - it may well have been hired. But the Regiment probably held onto the table until they left India in 1861 (General De Berry and Captain Stewart).
- There is no evidence that the 24th sold their table when they left India - it may not have been theirs to sell. But the owners of the table may well have sold it to any of those who claim it is or has been in their possession, including:

    - 61st (Gloucesters) who may have sold to
    - 41st (Black Watch) who sold to
    - 36th (Worcesters) who sold to
    - 9th (Norfolks)

    Or

    - 100th (Leinsters) who entrusted their table to the Army Council - unlikely
    - R.A. Mess Rawalpindi - unlikely
    - R.A. Mess Kirkee who bought their table from 14th Light Dragoons who reputedly bought it from the 24th in 1856 - obviously inaccurate

    Or

    - Another table as yet untraced!

The "mystery" remains!

THE FATEH FOUNDATION

THE CHILLIANWALA LECTURE SERIES - 1

FOREWORD

The Battle of Chillianwala, fought by the Sikhs and the British 150 years ago in 1849, is one of those stirring events most nations would remember with pride for generations to come. But not our nation. This epic battle in which vastly outnumbered Sikh soldiers of the erstwhile Lahore Durbar almost ended British expansionism in India is forgotten although it is solemnly remembered on the grounds of Chelsea's Royal Hospital in London before a memorial for some of the British officers and men who fell at Chillianwala in the first hour of the battle. Wreaths have been laid at this memorial for the last 149 years.

Do we similarly honour the unconquerable spirit of our heroes who faced formidable odds on that battlefield? We do not. Most of us cannot even tell the difference between Chillianwala and Jallianwala!

The Fateh Foundation has taken a small step forward by instituting the Chillianwala Memorial Lecture to be held on January 13 every year - the date on which that epic battle was fought. This first lecture was delivered in 1998 by Lt. General Kirpal Singh Randhawa, an outstanding soldier in his own right.

Lectures in the future will range from historical to contemporary events with the aim of placing in perspective the possibilities and pitfalls which face nations. Particularly ours.

Patwant Singh
Chairman
The Fateh Foundation, New Delhi

THE CHILLIANWALA BATTLE - In the aftermath of Ranjit Singh and his Empire

(Part of a lecture given by Lt Gen K S Randhawa)

By sheer force of his personality Maharaja Ranjit Singh, born in 1780, became the unquestioned ruler of the Punjab from 1799 to 1839, his kingdom being the last bastion to hold out against the British - a symbol of their incomplete conquest of India.

Relying on unconventional statecraft and dazzling display of daring and courage, he wielded his warrior nation to extend the Empire from the Sutlej to Kabul in Afghanistan and from Ladakh to Iskardu and Tuklakote in Little Tibet.

Every invasion of India till then had been from west to east, across the Indus, from 2000BC onwards, when the Aryans came in. For the first time in history, an Indian, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, went westwards, crossed the Indus River in 1826, going right onto Kabul. The British followed him, but with his assistance. In the south, he acquired the cis-Sutlej States.

Deciding against an open confrontation with the British, Ranjit Singh chose to enter into the 1809 Treaty with them by which he forfeited his claim to the cis-Sutlej States, but retained control over his existing territories south of the Sutlej, where he had the right to continue policing them with his troops. The British in turn agreed not to interfere north of the Sutlej. Maharaja Ranjit Singh was no fool to sign the Treaty of 1809. He was quite clear about his inability to push his empire across the Sutlej and against the British whose resources were far greater than his own. His future lay westward.

Ranjit Singh avoided going to war with the British at the cost of accepting their protectorate over the cis-Sutlej territories. This compulsion made him all the more determined to modernise his armed forces along European lines for which he hired a number of European officers, the most notable of these being two former Colonels of Napoleon's *Grande Army*, Jean Francois Allard and Jean Baptiste Ventura, who trained and reorganised Ranjit Singh's cavalry and infantry respectively. Ranjit Singh, impressed by the stocky Gurkhas of Hazara District, also enlisted them into the Sikh Army. The British inherited them from the Sikhs, including their typical rifle-green uniforms which were designed for Ranjit Singh's Army!

THE INTRIGUES AND THE BATTLE FOR SUCCESSION

The splendour and greatness of the Sikh Durbar ended with Ranjit Singh's death on 27 June 1839. He left behind seven sons, born of different women but none capable of ruling his Kingdom. Court intrigues, betrayals and assassinations attended his succession and the Army became an uncontrollable and dissatisfied centre of power, eager for war.

The royal family, with no worthy successor to carry on Ranjit Singh's tradition of greatness, the nobles of the Sikh Durbar and the Council of Ministers sensing an opportunity for self-aggrandizement began playing Ranjit Singh's family members against one another in a bitter struggle for power.

The court intrigues were dominated by two factions, the more influential being the three Dogra brothers, Gulab Singh, Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh. Dhyan Singh's son Heera Singh, a great favourite of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, came close to becoming a Dogra-Sikh ruler himself. Though not always in accord, one or the other of these Dogras managed to be in effective power at Lahore, allowing their kinsmen to set up an almost independent Dogra principality in Jammu and Kashmir.

The other faction comprised the Sikh aristocracy, such as the Sandhawalia brothers, who resented Dogra influence. Both these factions engaged in a not so subtle power struggle, and used the royal claimants as pawns in their fight for the Sikh Durbar. There were others however whose loyalties were unquestionable like Fakir Arizuddin, Ranjit Singh's able advisor on foreign affairs and the Kashmiri Brahmin Dina Nath who handled revenue and finance.

The war of succession ended in 1845 after Ranjit Singh's youngest son, Dalip Singh, a mere boy, ascended the throne, under Rani Jindan's regency. Despite political instability, the Sikh Sardars and their soldiery undertook noteworthy campaigns, distinguished by their daring and

courage. The first of these was into Little Tibet and the second into Afghanistan, to lend a hand to the British to overcome the rebellion of Dost Mohammad.

EARLIER CAMPAIGNS

Earlier, a wedge had been driven into Tibet in 1834 with Gen. Zorawar Singh's annexation of Ladakh. Ranjit Singh forbade a further thrust to avoid conflict with the Chinese Emperor but with no reaction from the Chinese, his son Nau Nihal Singh had permitted Gen Zorawar to move on and take Iskardu. Gen Zorawar captured Garo in June 1841 with one column marching eastward along the Kumaon Hills to cut off British contact with Lhasa. Gen Zorawar then took Tuklakote on 29 August 1841 annihilating the Tibetans. The Sikhs had pierced the heart of Tibet, going right up to Rudok.

The British protest to the Lahore Durbar was politely warded off. While these exchanges were going on the Chinese mustered their armies to defend Lhasa and isolated Zorawar Singh and his men at 12000 feet in bitter cold and in desperate straits. The Sikh Army, hungry and cold, tried to fight its way out but the gallant Zorawar fell on 12 December 1841 and his men were butchered in cold blood after they had laid down their arms on Chinese assurances of being permitted to return unmolested. The Chinese reoccupied their Tibetan possessions however with Leh still flying the Sikh Flag.
By the Spring of 1842, Sikh reinforcements reached Leh, and forced the Chinese to retreat and they reoccupied Ladakh. The column heading for Garo reached the boundary in August 1841 while another encircled a Chinese force sent from Lhasa and decimated it, taking the Chinese Commander prisoner. The Sikhs had made up for their winter defeat but learnt a lesson as well: campaigning in winter in this region was tough. On 17 October 1842 the Durbar Envoy signed a Treaty with the representative of the Chinese Emperor at Lhasa, making the boundaries of Ladakh and Tibet inviolable but open to trade.

In the meanwhile, common British-Sikh interests in Afghanistan made Sher Singh, another son of Ranjit Singh, order Gen. Avitabile to move from Peshawar to the relief of the British. The Sikh troops recaptured Ali Masjid beyond the Khyber and relieved Jalalabad.

Amir Dost Mohammad was given Kabul's throne.

(The lecture then proceeded to describe the First Sikh War)

THE SECOND SIKH WAR

As British Regiments were now garrisoned in Lahore, it was obvious the conspirators had succeeded in their aims. The Sikh Army was disbanded and a convention entered into for the administration of the Government by a Council at Lahore under a British Superintendent during the minority of Dalip Singh, the youngest of Ranjit Singh's sons. The country between the Beas and Sutlej, comprising the districts of Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and Kangra, was transferred to the British. Retaining suzerainty, they sold the valley of Kashmir to Raja Gulab Singh Dogra for a paltry five million rupees.

The disgusted Sikh soldiers, whose regiments had been disbanded, realised the extent of their betrayal, and the feeling of revenge mounted. The sense of outrage of the disbanded Sikh troops and patriots was to be the root cause of the Second Anglo-Sikh War. In the forthcoming battle of Chillianwala the Sikhs, now under able and upright commanders repaid the debts they owed and this time treachery did not quite work for the British.

In the British view there was to be no war in the next decade. Lord Hardinge, the British Governor General had ordered a reduction in the army but as subsequent events proved, this belief was ill-conceived. The first to challenge British domination was Diwan Mulraj, the Sikh Durbar's Governor of Multan and Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala at Hazara. Chattar Singh's son Sher Singh Attariwala followed his father's example and also threw his forces against the British.

On hearing of Lord Gough's advance on Lahore, Sher Singh Attariwala in a tactical move, sent covering troops through the fords towards the river's left bank, for delaying the enemy's advance and sending early warning. To cover this manoeuvre, Sher Singh deployed heavy artillery on the left bank of the Chenab: a stratagem which was overlooked by Lord Gough as he led the British advance party to attack the troops of the Sikh advance guard who were now retreating on Sher Singh's orders. The British came under fire of the Sikh guns on the right bank and it soon became evident that the British position had become untenable. Under cover of their artillery, the Sikh infantry and cavalry carried the day. The Sikhs captured British guns and the colours of a British regiment, this victory at Ramnagar giving a much needed boost to their morale.
Stunned by the defeat, Lord Dalhousie took the initiative in his own hands and directed his General Staff to prepare a blanket attack on the Sikhs before they could strengthen their positions. The main action plan of the British was to prevent a union of Chattar Singh's army from Attock and that of Sher Singh's. However, in the meantime the British had defeated Mulraj at Multan and felt adequately rejuvenated to face the now united army of Chattar Singh and Sher Singh Attariwala.

BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA

In an amazing coincidence, the battle of Chillianwala was fought on almost the same area where Porus, with his elephants, chariots and archers, had fought Alexander's cavalry 2175 years earlier.

Sher Singh displayed exceptional skill by judiciously selecting his position which was protected on the left by a low ridge of hills intersected with ravines and the main stream of the Jhelum, the right being posted in different villages enclosed by a thick jungle.

On 13 January 1849 the British launched their attack. Their artillery advanced to an open space in front of the village of Chillianwala and opened fire on the Sikh artillery. The Sikhs replied with a vigorous cannonade. As the fire ceased the British drew up in order of battle and charged at the enemy's centre in an attempt to force the Sikhs into the river. The assault was led by Brigadier Pennyquick. For the Sikhs, the conditions were made to order. Scattering into the brushwood jungle they began their hit and run tactics, their snipers taking a heavy toll of the British cavalry and infantry. Those that got through the brushwood and

the ravines were easily repulsed in the hand-to-hand fighting with the main body of the Sikh troops.

Brig. Pennyquick leading the Brigade in the front fell as did his son Ensign Pennyquick who was mortally injured while trying to protect the body of his father. Four British guns and the colours of three British Regiments fell to the Sikhs and the British registered nearly 3000 dead or wounded in the area of Chillianwala. A testimony left by a British observer says: "The Sikhs fought like devils, fierce and untamed....Such a mass of men I never set eyes on and as plucky as lions: they ran right on the bayonets and struck their assailants when they were transfixed."

But, once again, as at Ferozeshah, the Sikhs failed to drive home their advantage. Having suffered considerable losses themselves they were not aware of the magnitude of the punishment they had inflicted on the British. It then poured incessantly for three days - which kept the Sikhs separated from their quarry - and on the fourth day as the sun shone again, the British had pulled out and retreated across the Chaj to the banks of the Chenab.

The Attariwalas sent George Lawrence, who was their prisoner, with terms for a truce, which included the investment of Dalip Singh as Maharaja. This, however, the British did not accept.

Once more, fate and destiny had conspired against a victory for the Sikhs, bringing to mind Shah Mohammad's words:

"We won the Battle but we lost the Fight."

THE FINALE - BATTLE OF GUJARAT, 21 FEBRUARY 1849

The Attariwalas then advanced towards the Chenab and entrenched their forces between Gujarat and the river. However by now they had only 59 guns to the 66 of the British and far less manpower. They repeated their mistake by firing too soon, betraying their positions and exhausting their ammunition. The British launched a cavalry and infantry charge which could not be contained by the Afghan cavalry which had reinforced the Sikhs. Sheer numbers finally decided the issue. The Sikhs gave way and the Attariwalas finally surrendered their army and their swords near Rawalpindi, completing the end of the Sikh Durbar.

In the maze of all the machinations that went into the terms of the surrender, Maharaja Dalip Singh was made to hand over the legendary Kohinoor and step down from his illustrious father's throne, never to sit on it again. As a veteran summed it up: *"Aaj Ranjit Singh mar gaya."* "Today Ranjit Singh has died."

SPIRIT OF THE KHALSA

However, from the ashes and dust rose a proud nation whose gallantry and steadfastness against fearful odds soon filled the ranks of the new Indian Army, first pursuing British interests and then Independent India's a century later. As always, they had proved their

loyalty and gallantry to the salt they swore by, being bestowed more gallantry awards than any other peoples in the region.

It is in the destiny of the Sikhs to face tribulations time and again and to rise and be resurrected even stronger. This is the spirit which gave birth to the Khalsa and made warriors out of people who never let themselves down.

They fought the British to the bitter end but having handed over their swords like the soldiers of yore they became Britain's foremost troops winning more Victoria Crosses than any other people. They made military history when twenty-one of them, from one single unit (the 36th Sikhs), in a single day, received the highest military decoration that Britain could bestow on soldiers of the Indian Army *(at that time Ed.)*. This was on 12 September 1897 at Saragarhi, a feat of gallantry and sacrifice unsurpassed in the annals of military history.

To this day their erstwhile foes, the Pathans, faithfully maintain the Saragarhi Monument in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, a tribute to their then foes, the 21 Sikh heroes.

Then came the struggle for India's Independence. With less than two per cent of the population, no other people willingly gave their lives and sacrificed so much as did the Sikhs, whether at Jallianwala Bagh, the conspiracy cases, the *Koma Gata Maru* episode or banishment to the Andaman Islands. In the same vein, it was the destiny of a great unit, 1st Sikhs, to be landed straight into battle in Srinagar in October 1947, to stem the tide and uphold India's right and so save Kashmir. It must have given great pride to the spirit of Ranjit Singh that his soldiery, which ultimately formed the Sikh and Punjab Regiments, have won more laurels in battle than any other segment of the Indian Army.

Destiny continues to pursue the Sikhs even in the late twentieth century, in the same manner as it did their forefathers. They have risen from the desecrated temple of their Gods, the holiest of the holy, the Golden Temple, assaulted by a modern army with tanks and artillery. They have also risen from the ashes of their brethren whose corpses littered the streets of India's capital Delhi, all of this as recently as 1984.

A difficult people to understand - and not everyone understood them - led a seasoned British Commanding Officer of the Sikhs to write a small introduction for newly commissioned British Officers assigned to Sikh units in India; "There cannot be a more horrendous people when honour is at stake! Yet! Put your arms around the man and hug him like a brother and apologise. Before you have finished, he has melted like butter in the hot sun and is ready to take on the world for you."

Ranjit Singh is no more but the spirit of the Khalsa continues to live, not only in the battlefields of valour, but in the ability of these people to reach the highest levels of excellence in every sphere, all over the world.

PRESENTATION OF SILVER TRUMPET AND TRUMPET BANNER by SHRI K R NARAYANAN, THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA, TO THE PRESIDENT'S BODYGUARD - 16th November 1998

Photo R C Worts



The first day cover was issued to commemorate the presentation of a new President's Silver Trumpet and Trumpet Banner by Shri K R Narayanan, the President of India, to the President's Bodyguard. This was the ninth Trumpet and Banner that the regiment had received since Independence, the others being awarded by:

Dr Rajendra Prasad	14 May 1957
Dr S Radhakrishnan	He was to make the presentation on 21 October 1962, but the parade had to be cancelled due to the Sino-Indian war. The Trumpet and Banner were later presented informally.
Dr Zakir Husain	His untimely death in 1969 prevented the presentation taking place.

Shri V V Giri	30 September 1973 to commemorate the bi centenary of the Regiment
Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed	21 March 1975
Shri N Sanjiva Reddy	11 December 1978
Giani Zail Singh	6 October 1983
Shri R Venkataraman	24 October 1988
Dr Shanker Dayal Sharma	18 October 1993

The President's Bodyguard, which completed 225 years of distinguished service on 30 September 1998, is the senior unit of the Indian Army and takes the position as 'Right of the Line' on all occasions.

The PBG, as it is known today, was raised in 1773 at Benares by the then Governor, Warren Hastings, with a strength of 50. Today it comprises 3 officers, 14 JCOs and 161 men, backed up by administrative personnel. Equipped with armoured cars, its men are trained for operational duties, both as armoured and airborne troops as well as their ceremonial role.

In 1784 the unit became The Governor General's Bodyguard (GGBG) and, in 1858, The Viceroy's Bodyguard, though it continued to be referred to as GGBG. In 1944 it was briefly known as 44th Divisional Reconnaissance Squadron (GGBG). In 1947 it once more became The Governor General's Bodyguard and, on 26 January 1950, with India's declaration as a Republic, it became The President's Bodyguard.

The badge of the PBG comprises the State Symbol born aloft on an open parachute supported by crossed lances held together by its title. The motto is *Bharat Mata Ki Jai* (Victory to Mother India) and the colours of the Regiment are sky blue and maroon, as for airborne troops.

Recruitment to the Bodyguard is restricted to Sikhs, Jats and Rajputs, with officers and administrative staff drawn from all over India. A further restriction is a minimum height of 6 ft. for a trooper.

The horses are all Bay in colour, except for that of the Regimental Trumpeter which is always a Grey charger. They are required to be of a minimum height of 157.5 cms, measured at the shoulder and, like their counterparts in the British Household Cavalry, are the only horses in the Indian Army permitted to wear full manes. They have a blue saddle cloth with a sheep skin ring on the saddle. The Sowar carries a lance with a red over white pennant signifying "Blood Before Surrender".

The picture of the Banner is taken from the official programme of the event. The motifs, leaf surround and inscription are in gold on a red background, edged with gold and a golden fringe. From the First Day Cover it would seem that the other side of the Banner bears the regimental badge and an inscription on a pale blue background, edged with gold. Perhaps one of our Indian Army members will be able to confirm this.

LETTERS AND QUERIES

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh's article on the proposed Indian Army memorial gate in London elicited a couple of responses:

- Lieutenant Colonel Patric Emerson writes:

First of all, are these gates donated by India in memory of their soldiers, as Baroness Flather "visited India to sponsor a very worthy cause"; or are they to be paid for and erected by the British public in memory of the great aid that the Indian Army gave in two wars; or is it a combined effort by both Indians and British to erect them? That is not at all clear.

It has been said that the Heritage Fund are prepared to give up to 1 million pounds towards the project if a similar amount can be raised. Baroness Flather has spoken to a number of wealthy Indians in this country and received promises from them for large amounts of money. This makes it sound like the gates being donated by Indians in memory of their own army, unless of course the Heritage donation is taken as the British element of the fund. It seems a pity that some kind of appeal was not launched so that members of the public could show their appreciation by donating. It would be helpful to know who is meant to be donating these gates.

The gates are planned to span Constitution Hill a short distance down from Hyde Park Corner. This suits the Metropolitan Police very well as at present they close that section of road over weekends by placing a line of bollards across the road. After the erection of the gates all they will have to do is close them.

The Baroness is quoted as saying that she was saddened to see how little was done to commemorate the enormous contribution and sacrifice made by the people of the Indian sub-continent. She does not seem to realise that there are 6 different memorials to the deeds of the Indian soldiers. These include the India Gate at the Pavilion in Brighton as well as the Chattri on the Downs; two other smaller memorials in the country; the Indian Army Memorial Room at RMA Sandhurst and the Memorial Plaque in St Paul's. Members might not be aware that in the middle 60s the most senior of the I.A. British officers tried very hard to have a proper memorial erected in London. They were turned down by both the GLC and the government of the time on the grounds that there was already a plethora of monuments in the capital.

Anyone who reads the Indian English language press in this country will have seen their adverse comments on the plan to put the names of the contributors on or near the Gates. Surely there should be no names at all on the Gates - not even the VC winners - but the wording should commemorate ALL Indians who volunteered, such as "In memory of those from the sub-continent of India who volunteered to serve in the Forces during the two great World Wars" - or similar. It should also be noted that those people willing to donate so that their names can be publicly recorded have given nothing towards the Auchinleck Appeal which is actively helping those jawans and their widows who did help us and are now often in dire straits.
The present Canadian, Australian, South and West African gates in front of Buckingham Palace are quoted as examples. Only the one to Canada is a gate as the others are just plinths either side of The Mall and the entry to Birdcage Walk. All of them just have the name of the country inscribed and nothing more.

(*The Times* newspaper of 24 February 1999 reported that the gates, to be part-funded by 900,000 pounds from the National Lottery, with a further 900,000 pounds to be raised by public appeal, will commemorate the services of those from Africa and the Caribbean, as well as the Indian sub-continent. Events connected with the public appeal will include dinners in the Tower of London and Banqueting House and a September *mela* in Hyde Park. Ed.)

- Ernest Gardner writes:

Sad to relate it is not just in this country that the sacrifice of the Indian Army in two World Wars is forgotten.

A few years ago I was with a group holidaying in India. While we were in Delhi we were returning to our hotel when we passed a fine memorial with three dismounted cavalrymen.

One of our party asked our guide what it was. She was a young, well-educated and intelligent girl and the Rear Admiral will not be impressed by her reply, any more than I was. With no great show of interest she replied, "I don't know. It is just called the three horsemen". In fact it is the memorial to the sacrifice of the Indian Cavalry in the First World War.

(I assume Ernest is referring to the Teen Murti Memorial. Originally erected to the memory of those officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the 15th Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade composed of cavalry regiments from the Indian States of Hyderabad, Mysore and Jodhpur and with detachments from Bhavnagar, Kashmir and Kathiawar, who gave their lives in the Middle East Theatre during the Great War, it is now revered as a memorial to the fallen of all Indian Cavalry regiments. Ed.)

In response to Mike Cunningham's article entitled Indianisation - A Mixed Blessing (Vol. 15, No 4, page 139) Lieutenant Colonel Tony Mains writes:

I am taking the liberty to comment on this article as I am one of the few KCOs of the Indian Army still living and one of the even fewer band who served prior to the outbreak of WWII, i.e.,

Sandhurst - 1932-33
Commissioned - 2 Feb 1934
ULIA - attached 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regt 1934
Joined - 2nd Battalion 9th Gurkha Rifles 1935

My term was the last to have Indian Cadets at Sandhurst - three in my term and company: one of these, Pran Nath Narang, was attached to the Dorsets with me: when I left them I handed over command of No 6 Platoon B Company to George Isaacs, an ICO just commissioned from the IMA. Finally I served on five years after Independence as Senior Staff Officer (GSO I) of the Infantry School, Mhow, so I have first-hand knowledge of how Nehru treated KCIOs and ICOs as regards pay and allowances. I might add that although I was an Officer of Gurkhas, my five years' service in Security Intelligence, all, except Iraq 1941 and Burma Retreat 1942, in Eastern India, caused me to know a large number of Indian Civil, Police and Railway Officers, as well as KCIOs and ICOs.

I will say at the outset that I agree entirely with the writer's final paragraph as to the moral issues of the mechanics of Indianisation. It was, indeed, a poor compromise. My comments are on a number of inaccurate or misleading facts.

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The first course, the one which the early Indian Officers such as Cariappa, Rajendrasinghji, Srinagesh, Rudra etc. attended, was at Indore and not the RMC.

The Skeen Committee noted that the early failure rate at the RMC was unacceptably high - 30%. This resulted in the foundation of the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College at Dehra Dun - a militarised "public school" specifically designed to fit boys for life at the RMA and RMC. This brought the failure rate down dramatically.

It may be that the earliest Indian Officers were designated "KCOs" but from quite early on they were "KCIOs". KCIOs held the same Commissions and had the same terms of service as British Officers (KCOs), with one important exception in their favour - as they were generally older than their British counterparts, they received a six month antedate on their commissions. Prior to the arrival of the Officers from the IMA, the terms KCO, KCIO and VCO were entirely legalistic; they were not used in ordinary conversation. Both KCOs and KCIOs were usually referred to as British Officers (BOs) and VCOs as Indian Officers (IOs).

Indianised Battalions

I do not know how many Indian Officers refused to leave their original regiments, but to the best of my knowledge only three succeeded - "Reggie" Rajendrasinghji, a scion of the Nawanagar family and a British public schoolboy (Malvern), in the 2nd Royal Lancers - "Jick" Rudra, a Christian who served as a Private in the Royal Fusiliers in France in the Great War, was wounded and finished as a Sergeant, in the 4/15th Punjab Regiment - and a Sikh officer whose name and regiment I have forgotten. I think this was the least of the grievances. Many of the Indianised units were very good indeed - the 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles were the equivalent of any British officered battalion; they, and other like battalions, had a great sense of pride in their achievements.

Page 140 - Unattached List Indian Army

It should be clearly understood that NO cadet, British or Indian, be it from the RMC or IMA, was commissioned direct into a unit of the Indian Army but into a holding Corps, the ULIA, and was attached to a British unit in India for one year as a platoon commander. This was intended originally to familiarise the newly commissioned KCO with India, particularly as he would not only never command a platoon, but with the paucity of officers probably would be commanding a company as a 2/Lieutenant (I was commanding a company in 2/9 Gurkhas within ONE month of joining). Further, as the RMC, and presumably the IMA's syllabuses were, except for Drill, PT and Riding, purely theoretical, it gave excellent practical military training to all three categories.

I see that the old hardy annual of the bad treatment of ULIAs by British Regiments has come up again. In spite of hearing this ad nauseam, I have never met anyone who suffered from it. The Dorsets gave us, including Narang, a warm welcome - the CO telling us that he would give us command of a platoon in a rifle company and be treated exactly the same as a Dorset subaltern: he added that should we get top flight Indian regiments, the Dorsets would claim the credit. All four of us were very happy in the Dorsets, and I am sure that later the ICO, George Isaacs, was too.

Page 140 - Warrant Officers

I agree with the writer here. It seems quite wrong that in four battalions of one regiment, senior NCOs could look forward to VCO status - a sword, a salute from ORs etc., but in the fifth, only to that of a Warrant Officer Class II.

Page 141 - Commissions

No additional Commissions were required to give ICOs "Power of Command" over British troops - all that was necessary was an Order of the Viceroy acting as the Governor General in Council. George Isaacs of the second IMA batch was attached to the Dorsets and was sent to take over No 6 Platoon from me when a message came from the Adjutant to hold everything until his position was clarified - subsequently a signal was received that ICOs had a dispensation from the Viceroy.

Page 141 - Pay

This was an emotive issue which was aggravated when, as a result of war time conditions, ICOs were given the same responsibilities as KCOs/KCIOs. Be that as it may, it was wrong at any time for officers serving in the same unit to have different rates of pay.

To understand the position fully it must be realised that the Army in India, that is units of the British Army as well as the Indian Army, was not subject to War Office control but was autonomous, owing allegiance to the Indian Defence Department, who paid and maintained them. This was a great advantage to the British taxpayer as India in peace time paid for nearly half of the British Army; a considerable burden on a poor country.

The Indian Finance Department was extremely concerned at the idea of having to finance a large increase of Officers and looked for a solution to ease the burden. The obvious answer was to pay the newcomers less and this they justified mainly on the lesser responsibilities of a platoon commander as against a company officer, or more likely a company commander. It could be taken further - I commanded the battalion in 1939 as a Lieutenant of five years' service on a rail move from Dehra Dun to Nowshera: this would hardly come the way of an ICO of this length of service. They argued further that an ICO being indigenous would have fewer expenses than an expatriate.

An expatriate allowance has been mentioned - the ICS had one paid in sterling into their English bank, and I believe also had some of the other Secretary of State's services, but not Army Officers. India had a consolidated pay structure for both British and Indian Army officers, which was almost double that paid in the UK as it included an element for services provided free there, but not in India. In addition, Indian Army Officers received an Indian Army allowance added to their monthly pay. This was never called an expatriate allowance, nor did I ever consider it as such; I would have thought it very odd if I, with the responsibilities of a company commander, was paid the same as a British Army subaltern commanding a platoon.

The KCIOs/ICOs position after Independence

The ICOs pay was brought into line with that of other officers about 1943 and the necessity of making the best use of manpower led to the abolition of Indianised units. This led to the reinstatement of VCOs in those units and the raising of the ICO's status to equal that of KCOs/KCIOs. This was the position at Independence - all Indian officers being equal in pay and status.

Not long after Independence Britain, in issuing a new Pay Code, abolished various forms of Extra Pay Duty, such as Command, Staff, Instructors and Corps Pay. India, although now independent, slavishly followed suit and also issued a new Pay Code which reduced the pay of ICOs, the reductions to be spread over nine years. The Prime Minister, Nehru, justified this on the grounds, first, that officers were still getting a rate above that which the original ICOs received when leaving the IMA and, second, that India could no longer afford to pay officers at the same rate as the British. Nehru's legal arguments left the KCIO's pay untouched at the old British rate with attendant privileges, such as payment of pensions in sterling anywhere in the world. None of this helped morale and the exemption of the KCIOs caused deep resentment. It also meant a considerable increase in the use of soldiers as servants as officers struggled to make ends meet.

Tailpiece

The most vociferous critics in the Infantry School were the Lieutenant Colonel Instructors, of which there were five in Senior Officers Wing; they stood to lose Rupees 300 per month Instructor Class A allowance as well as the reduction in pay. I was caught one evening in the Staff Officer's Mess bar by two such - an Anglo Indian Gunner and a Sikh Infanteer. Their moan was that if they had been commanding a gunner regiment or infantry battalion they would have had at their disposal cars and orderlies, but because they had been specially selected as Instructors they got neither. The Commandant brought this to the notice of Army HQ where some bright spark had the idea of enhancing their status by making them Local Colonels. This had little favour with them as they would not receive any increase in pay, and none from me. I stated bluntly that I also should have a 'red hat', or how would I maintain discipline among this 'bolshie' lot if they were senior to me and, anyway, I was five or six year's senior to them in service.

All this happened a long time ago, so memory is fallible. I would welcome any comment.

In response to Paul Brewster's article on unofficial clasps to Indian General Service medals (Vol. 15, No 4, page 131) Brigadier John Randle writes:
As an officer late of The Devonshire Regiment and a minor student of the Devons' history, WUNTHO rang a faint bell and, pursuing it, I was reminded that 2 Devons took a very full part in the Wuntho Expedition of 1891. In particular, a famous regimental officer Captain (later Colonel) T A H Davies was awarded a DSO for his part in that expedition and other incidents in the Third Burma War. There are no less than five pages in the Regimental History about the Wuntho fighting.

A friend also reminded me that Colonel Davies' medals are on display in RHQ Exeter and when I was there recently I had a look at them. Amongst no less than three Indian Service medals he has the IGS medal with clasp BURMA 1889-92 (his others are medals and clasp for the 2nd Afghan War and TIRAH 1897), but no WUNTHO clasp. If anyone was entitled to a WUNTHO clasp I am sure that he was.

Nowadays on Old Comrades' parades there are always a few old soldiers sporting, perhaps for reasons of male coquetry, some of these unofficial medals for DUNKIRK, NORMANDY etc. One wonders if the unofficial WUNTHO clasp was not a Victorian equivalent of this male coquetry, perhaps produced by an enterprising Indian contractor to make a rupee or two.

With reference to Chris Kempton's letter about Subdr Barkat Singh GC (Vol. 15, No 4, pp150-151). The second sentence of para 2 (page 151) should have read "It also seems fairly *unlikely* that ....." not *certain.* Chris now makes the point that Barkat Singh would not have been in correspondence at all as there was nothing to correspond about until 1965.